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BC	 Law	 Enforcement	 Memorial
Sunday,	 September	 27,	 2015	 at	 1:00	 pm 
BC	 Legislature,	 Victoria,	 British	 Columbia
Muster	 at	 12:00	 pm,	 800	 block	 Wharf	 Street
On June 8, 2015, 35-year-old Edmonton Police Service 
Constable Daniel Woodall was shot and killed as he and 
several other officers attempted to serve an arrest warrant at a 
home.
As the officers attempted to enter the home, the man opened 
fire from inside. Constable Woodall was struck several times 
and was fatally wounded. A second officer was shot in the 
back but the bullet was stopped by his vest. The home became 
engulfed in flames following  the 
shooting  and the subject was later found 
deceased.
Constable Woodall had served with the 
Edmonton Police Service for eight years. 
He is survived by his wife and two 
children.
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IN MEMORIAM
“They	 Are	 Our	 Heroes.	 We	 Shall	 Not	 Forget	 Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
see p. 37
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	 Police	 Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
Live	 &	 Online
September	 25,	 2015
This 9th Bi-Annual OsgoodePD 
one day  intensive program on the 
law  of Search and Seizure in 
Canada will give you the latest and most important 
developments. You will get practical tactics and information 
you can use from prominent experts.
http://osgoodepd.ca/upcoming_programs/9th-bi-annual-symposium-on-search-and-seizure-law-in-canada/
see 
page  
39-40
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Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
REGISTER NOW
AGENDA
PROGRAM FACULTY
WHO SHOULD
ATTEND
PRICE
 CREDITS
REQUEST
BROCHURE
DOWNLOAD
BROCHURE PDF
SPONSOR THIS
PROGRAM
HOTEL & PARKING
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
As we speak:  how to make your point and have it 
stick.
Peter Meyers and Shann Nix.
New York, NY: Atria Books, 2011.
HM 1166 M49 2011
Creating effective teams: a guide for members 
and leaders.
Susan A. Wheelan, G.D.Q. Associates, Inc.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2016.
HD 66 W485 2015
Dangerous personalities:  an FBI profiler shows 
how to identify and protect yourself from harmful 
people. 
Joe Navarro, MA, FBI Special Agent (Ret.); with Toni 
Sciarra Poynter.
Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2014.
HV 7431 N38 2014
Diversity profile of British Columbia.
Law Foundation of British Columbia. 
Vancouver, BC: 2014.
HB 3530 B7 L38 2014
Don't make me think, revisited: a common sense 
approach to Web usability.
Steve Krug.
Berkeley, CA: New Riders, 2014.
TK 5105.888 K78 2014
Everything  you ever needed to know about 
training: a one-stop shop for everyone interested 
in training, learning and development.
Kaye Thorne, David Mackey.
London, UK; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2007.
HF 5549.5 T7 T4625 2007
Evidence-based training methods:  a guide for 
training professionals.
Ruth Colvin Clark.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2015.
HF 5549.5 T7 C58 2015
Information dashboard  design:  displaying data for 
at-a-glance monitoring.
Stephen Few.
Burlingame, CA: Analytics Press, 2013.
HD 30.213 F49 2013
Painless presentations: the proven, stress-free way 
to successful public speaking.
Lenny Laskowski.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012.
PN 4129.15 L38 2012
Stop teaching our kids to kill: a call  to action 
against TV, movie, and video game violence.
Lt. Col. Dave Grossman and Gloria DeGaetano.
New York, NY: Harmony Books, 2014.
HQ 784 M3 G76 2014
The art of thinking clearly.
Rolf Dobelli; translated by Nicky Griffin.
New York, NY: Harper, 2013.
BF 442 D632 2013
Writing for success.
Tara Horkoff.
S.l.: 2014.
PE 1112 H67 2014 
Younger brain, sharper mind:  a 6-step plan for 
preserving  and improving  memory and attention 
at any age.
Eric R. Braverman.
Emmaus, PA: Rodale: Distributed to the trade by 
Macmillan, 2011.
QP 376 B739 2011
www.10-8.ca
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QUESTIONING	 NOT	 ALWAYS	 A	 
SEARCH
R. v. Sebben, 2015 ONCA 270
Following  a report of an erratic 
driver, a police officer stopped the 
accused and administered a roadside 
breath test. He passed.  During 
computer checks, the officer received 
information that the accused had a possible 
connection to drugs.  The officer then asked the 
accused (seated in the driver’s seat) for consent to 
search his vehicle. The accused replied that he didn’t 
think  he needed to give consent but began to roll his 
rear window down. He said the officer could look in 
the back because all he had were tools and 
Christmas presents. When the officer said the search 
wouldn’t be for Christmas presents, but for things 
like drugs or marihuana, the accused immediately 
reached in the centre console area, indicated he had 
marihuana, showed a clear Ziploc bag  of it and gave 
it to the officer. He was arrested for possession of 
marihuana and a search of the vehicle  as an incident 
of that arrest followed. More marihuana was found 
and the accused was charged with drug offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The officer acknowledged that he did not 
have reasonable grounds to conduct a 
search when he decided to ask for the 
accused’s consent. Nor was the officer 
acting  on the belief that the accused had consented 
to a search. The officer said he did not get a chance 
to obtain a valid consent or review the standard 
consent form used by police. Rather, the  accused 
immediately said he  had marihuana and produced a 
bag  of it. The accused argued that he  was arbitrarily 
detained, denied his right to counsel when he was 
asked to consent to the  search, and subjected to an 
unreasonable search that led to both the production 
of the bag  of marihuana and the subsequent 
discovery of more marihuana in his vehicle. 
The judge found that the accused was detained at 
the roadside, both before and after the breath test 
was administered, but these detentions were not 
arbitrary. Nor was there a s. 8  Charter breach. The 
officer’s request (to search)  was not a search for 
constitutional purposes. Rather, the accused chose to 
voluntarily turn over the baggie of marihuana to the 
police officer in the hope of curtailing  a more 
thorough search of his vehicle. However, the judge 
did find a s. 10(b) Charter violation since the 
accused had not been advised of his right to counsel 
when his detention continued following  the breath 
test. Nevertheless, the evidence was admitted under 
s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana and possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his drug 
convictions arguing  that the trial 
judge erred in not finding  a s. 8 
Charter violation which, when 
combined with the s. 10(b)  breach, ought to have 
resulted in the  exclusion of the evidence. He 
submitted that the officer’s request for consent 
marked the start of a  search and anything  produced 
subsequent to that request constituted a  seizure 
under s. 8. Thus, the officer’s request for permission 
to search followed immediately  by the production of 
the marihuana and the subsequent search of the 
vehicle was a single, ongoing, warrantless and non-
consensual search.  
Justice Doherty, however, speaking  for the 
unanimous Court of Appeal, concluded that not all 
questioning  of a detained person by police can be 
regarded as the start or part of a search under s. 8:
Not every request by an officer that a person 
consent to a search is automatically a 
search.  Sometimes questions, including  a 
request to conduct a consent search, will be part 
of a subsequent search.  In other fact situations, 
“Not every request by an officer that a person consent to a search is automatically a 
search. Sometimes questions, including a request to conduct a consent search, will be part of a 
subsequent search. In other fact situations, the questions will not form any part of a search.”
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the questions will not form any part of a 
search. A fact-specific inquiry is necessary.
Any request by a police officer that a detained 
person consent to a search must be closely 
scrutinized.  The power imbalance in that 
situation is obvious.  That does not, however, 
mean that any request to search should be 
deemed to be the commencement of a 
search. That approach ignores the fact-sensitive 
nature of the inquiry. 
In this case, there was no evidence that:
• the [accused] felt compelled to cooperate 
with the police officer;
• the [accused] believed that a search of his 
vehicle was inevitable regardless of whether 
he consented;
• the [accused] was subject to any demand or 
direction by the police officer;
• the police officer said anything  to the 
[accused] that invited or induced the 
[accused] to produce the narcotics; and
• the officer intended to search of the vehicle 
regardless of whether the [accused] 
consented.
On the facts as found by the trial judge, the 
police officer had commenced the process by 
which he hoped to obtain the [accused’s] 
in formed consent to a search o f the 
vehicle. Before he could complete that process, 
the [accused] voluntarily and unilaterally 
produced a bag of marihuana in the hope of 
avoiding  more serious problems. The [accused’s] 
production of the marihuana effectively ended 
the officer’s need to make any further inquiries 
requesting the [accused’s] consent to a 
search.  The officer was entitled to search the 
vehicle as an incident of the [accused’s] arrest 
for possession of the bag of marihuana. On the 
officer’s evidence, there was no search, but 
rather a production of the marihuana in the bag 
by the [accused] followed by a search incident 
to an arrest. [references omitted, paras. 12-15]
There was no s. 8 Charter breach nor any reason to 
interfere with the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
FOCUSSED	 SUSPICION	 ALONE	 
DOES	 NOT	 CREATE	 DETENTION
R. v. Seagull, 2015 BCCA 164
The police received statements from 
two complainants  that the accused 
had engaged in sexual activities with 
them when they were boys. The 
police decided to interview the 
accused, the only suspect in the crimes. Rather than 
arresting  him though, the investigating  officer chose 
to arrange for an interview to gather evidence that 
would support charges. She left two messages for 
him but he did not immediately respond. The officer 
persisted and eventually spoke to the accused by 
telephone. She told him “vaguely and briefly” about 
the complaints and he agreed to come to the police 
station to provide  a statement. The   interview took 
place at 5 pm in an unlocked interview room. It 
lasted an hour and fifty minutes and was audio and 
video taped. The investigator did not advise the 
accused of his s. 10(b)  Charter right to retain and 
instruct counsel and began the interview as follows:
 
[Y]ou’re here on your own free will. You’re not 
under arrest or anything. You  can  certainly leave at 
anytime that you feel  like you’d like okay. Ah, no 
problems?
 
The officer then briefly explained that allegations of 
inappropriate sexual conduct had been made and 
told the accused that anything  he said could be used 
against him as evidence. The officer asked some 
general questions about the accused’s relationship 
with the boys, and then shifted to more specific 
questions about whether he had engaged in sexual 
activity with them. The officer repeatedly advised the 
accused she needed to know his side of the story. 
Eventually, the officer intensified her questions about 
whether the accused had initiated sexual acts with 
the boys. He was charged with sex offences.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued his statement should 
be excluded as evidence because it had 
been obtained in violation of his rights 
under s. 10(b) of the Charter. The judge, 
however, found the accused had willingly agreed to 
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the police interview. This, in his view, “conveyed an 
element of choice” by the accused that the interview 
was optional, not mandatory. The accused had 
understood and accepted the officer’s introductory 
advice that he was there of his own free will, was 
not under arrest and could leave at any time. 
Holding  the interview at the police station which 
limited the accused’s mobility was inconsequential 
to determining  whether a reasonable person would 
conclude he was not free to end the interview and 
depart. The judge concluded that the accused’s 
statements during  the interview and the surrounding 
circumstances demonstrated that he  was not 
detained when he gave his statement and his s. 10(b) 
rights had not been violated. While the accused 
never made inculpatory statements, the trial judge 
relied on his demeanour during  the interview to find 
his testimony at trial not credible. The judge did not 
accept any of the accused’s evidence and convicted 
him of sexual exploitation and sexual assault.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his sexual 
exploitation convictions arguing, in 
part, that the trial judge failed to 
recognize that he was detained 
while he gave his statement and should have been 
advised of his right to counsel under s. 10(b). In his 
view, a reasonable person in his circumstances, 
knowing  he was the  only suspect in an investigation 
focused on sexual misconduct with adolescents, 
would believe he was detained once he sat down for 
the interview with police. He contended that the 
officer’s decision not to arrest and charge him before 
the interview, despite having  the grounds to do so, 
was deliberate, tactical, and directed at depriving 
him of his right to counsel and the ability  to make an 
informed choice as to whether to speak to police. 
Further, he suggested that the purpose of the 
interview was not to determine if a crime had taken 
place by exploring  the complainants’ ages at the 
time of the sexual acts, the question of consent, or 
other issues related to the elements of the alleged 
crimes, but to obtain a  confession.  By failing  to 
immediately inform him of his right to counsel, the 
police breached   his Charter  rights had been 
breached and his statement was inadmissible  as 
evidence.
 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the 
accused was not detained.   Although he was the 
subject of highly-focussed suspicion when he was 
interviewed, the Crown said this alone was not 
determinative of detention.
Detention
Justice Neilson, writing  the Appeal Court’s judgment, 
described the legal principles governing  when a 
detention occurs as follows:
Detention identifies the point at which the 
authorities are obliged to immediately inform a 
suspect of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of 
the Charter. This recognizes the vulnerability of 
individuals who are taken under effective state 
control, and ensures that they have the 
opportunity to seek legal advice, and understand 
that they have a choice as to whether to 
cooperate with and speak to the authorities. 
Detention may be physical or psychological. 
Psychological detention occurs when a 
reasonable person in the subject’s position 
would conclude by reason of the state’s conduct 
that he or she has no choice but to comply with 
authorities. It may be difficult to determine when 
a person is psychologically detained. In 
addressing  this issue, the court should consider 
the entire interaction as it developed. [reference 
omitted, para. 35]
“Detention identifies the point at which 
the authorities are obliged to immediately 
inform a suspect of the right to counsel 
under s. 10(b) of the Charter.” 
“Psychological detention occurs when a reasonable person in the subject’s position would 
conclude by reason of the state’s conduct that he or she has no choice but to comply 
with authorities. It may be difficult to determine when a person is psychologically 
detained.”
Volume 15 Issue 3 - May/June 2015
PAGE 7
Factors to consider  in determining  whether an 
individual has been psychologically  detained 
include:
(a) The circumstances	 giving  rise to the encounter 
as they would reasonably be perceived by the 
individual: whether the police were providing 
general assistance; maintaining  general order; 
making  general inquiries regarding  a particular 
occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct, including the 
language used; the use of physical contact; the 
place where the interaction occurred; the 
presence of others; and the duration of the 
encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or circumstances 
of the individual where relevant, including  age; 
physical stature; minority status; level of 
sophistication.
 
In this case, the trial judge did not err in finding  the 
accused was not detained during  the police 
interview. Although the officer had grounds to arrest 
the accused but deliberately chose to interview him 
without advising  him of his right to counsel, a 
reasonable person, viewing  the interaction as a 
whole, would not have concluded the accused was 
deprived of his choice to cooperate with the police:
 
There is no question that the [accused] was the 
subject of precisely focussed suspicion, but this 
alone does not turn an encounter into a 
detention. What matters is the manner in which 
the police interacted with the suspect.
Nor is the fact that [the officer] had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] prior to the 
interview definitive in establishing  detention. … 
[E]ach case must be determined on its own facts 
in the context of all of the circumstances.
 
While one of [the officer’s] objectives was 
undoubtedly to obtain inculpatory admissions, 
this was not the sole purpose of the interview. 
She testified that in her experience cases of 
sexual assault often have two sides to the story 
and so she wished to discover the [accused’s] 
version of events. Consent was a real issue, 
given the boys’ ascending  ages over the four 
years of the alleged sexual activity and, contrary 
to the [accused’s] submission, [the officer] 
attempted to explore this with the [accused], as 
well as whether the sexual acts had occurred at 
all. I am accordingly satisfied there is evidentiary 
support for the trial judge’s conclusion that 
legitimate areas of inquiry remained and the 
interview had a valid investigatory purpose.
 
Most significantly, it is apparent that the 
[accused] was well-aware of the purpose of the 
interview, his potential jeopardy, and his rights 
in responding to the situation. He knew [the 
officer] was investigating allegations of sexual 
impropriety with the complainants. She told him 
he could be charged “right now”, and that a 
charge of sexual exploitation was a possible 
outcome. The [accused] knew he could leave, 
that he had the right to remain silent, and that he 
was entitled to advice from a lawyer. He 
voluntarily came to the interview without legal 
assistance, however, and spoke to [the officer] 
for almost two hours, during which he carefully 
retained control of what he was prepared to say, 
before the interview was terminated at his 
request.
The notion of choice is central in determining 
whether a person has been detained by the 
authorities. Because the [accused] did not testify 
on the voir dire there is no evidence of whether 
he subjectively believed that he had a choice as 
to cooperating with [the officer]. The objective 
evidence of their encounter clearly supports the 
trial judge’s findings. The [accused] has failed to 
persuade me that the judge made any 
reviewable error in concluding that he failed to 
establish that a reasonable person in his position 
“There is no question that the [accused] was the subject of precisely focussed 
suspicion, but this alone does not turn an encounter into a detention. ... Nor is the fact 
that [the officer] had reasonable grounds to arrest the [accused] prior to the interview 
definitive in establishing detention.”
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would have concluded that he had been 
deprived of the liberty of choice during  the 
interview with [the officer]. [references omitted, 
paras. 55-59]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions upheld.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BESTIALITY	 MORE	 THAN	 SEX	 
ACT	 WITH	 ANIMAL
R. v. D.L.W., 2015 BCCA 169
The accused brought the family dog 
into a bedroom, applied peanut 
butter to his teenage step  daughter’s 
vagina, and then videotaped the dog 
licking  her. He was charged with 
bestiality along  with other offences alleged to have 
been committed over years of repeated sexual 
molestation. These other charges included sexual 
assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual 
touching, sexual exploitation, and making  and 
possessing child pornography. 
British Columbia Supreme Court 
The judge found that the term “bestiality” 
included acts of sexual touching  with 
animals and penetration was not an 
element of the offence. “In my view, 
‘bestiality’ means touching  between a person and an 
animal for a  person’s sexual purpose,” said the 
judge. “This is reflected in the numerous guilty pleas 
entered on charges under s. 160 where the bestiality 
consists of an animal licking  a person’s genitals. It is 
also consistent with the entire  scheme of the 
[Criminal] Code.” Since the accused had 
encouraged the complainant to commit bestiality 
and had used peanut butter, he had aided and 
abetted her in committing  the offence and was 
therefore a party to the offence of bestiality under s. 
21(1)  of the Criminal Code. The accused was 
convicted of bestiality, along  with the other 13 
sexual offences, and he was sentenced to 16 years in 
prison.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed only 
the bestiality  conviction 
arguing  that penetration was 
a required element of the 
offence. He argued that the trial judge statutorily 
misinterpreted the bestiality provision by failing  to 
find that the Crown was required to prove 
penetration. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that a proper interpretation of the 
meaning  of bestiality would include  sexual activity 
of any kind between a person and an animal. 
Meaning of Bestiality
A two member majority of the Court of Appeal ruled 
that penetration remained an element of the offence 
of bestiality  as it had been in the common law. It 
concluded that previous amendments to legislation 
in 1954 (introducing  the term “bestiality” to the 
buggery provision of the Criminal Code) and 1985 
(creating  a separate offence  for bestiality)  had not 
changed the elements of this offence to include a 
broader range of sexual conduct with animals:
Bestiality has a long understood meaning  in 
Canadian criminal law. At the time the offence 
was created, Parliament saw fit to adopt 
language that included an element of 
penetration as part of offence. If Parliament had 
intended in the 1954 Amendment or the 1985 
Amendment to sever bestiality from its historical 
foundation, one would have expected it to so 
directly, using  clear and specific language. ... 
[para. 38]
Finding  the conduct in the case to be “most 
disturbing”, the majority commented that Parliament 
could criminalize sexual acts with animals beyond 
penetration by easily modifying  the  definition of 
bestiality or the essential elements of it. Since 
penetration remained an element of bestiality and 
there  was no act of penetration in this case, the 
appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered on 
the bestiality charge.
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A Different View
Chief Justice  Bauman had a  different 
opinion. In his view, the change to the 
Criminal Code  in 1954 amended the 
offence of bestiality such that it did not 
require penetration. “Nothing  in jurisprudence 
requires this Court to conclude that anal penetration, 
or indeed any kind of penetration, is a  required 
element of the offences created by s. 160 of the 
Code,” he said. “Applying  traditional principles of 
statutory interpretation allows us to conclude ... that 
s. 160(1)  creates a  general intent offence which 
encompasses sexual activity of any kind between a 
person and an animal.” Chief Justice Bauman would 
have dismissed the accused’s appeal and upheld the 
bestiality conviction. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ASD	 DELAY	 MUST	 BE	 RELATED	 
TO	 DRIVER	 IN	 PARTICULAR,	 NOT	 
MOTORISTS	 GENERALLY
R. v. Lomenda, 2015 SKCA 40
The accused was stopped at 8:17 pm 
by police to check his driver’s 
licence, vehicle registration and 
sobriety. At 8:20 pm he admitted to 
consuming  one beer about 15 
minutes earlier, but then, on further questioning, 
said it could possibly have been sooner. The officer 
decided to wait 15 minutes before administering  an 
ASD test. Then, during  further discussion at 8:32 pm 
the accused said he had four drinks over a two hour 
period with the last drink  being  45 minutes before 
the stop. At 8:36  pm the officer presented the ASD to 
the accused and a fail reading  was reported. The 
breath demand was read, the accused detained for 
“over .08” and he was informed of his right to 
counsel. He was transported to the police station, 
spoke to legal aid and provided two breath samples 
resulting  in readings of 150mg% and 140mg%. He 
was charged with impaired driving  and driving  over 
80mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The officer testified he waited 15 minutes 
before  administering  the ASD test 
because  he was worried about obtaining 
a false positive result (fail reading)  due to 
the presence of mouth alcohol. He also repeatedly 
said it was his standard procedure to wait 15 
minutes for an ASD sample to ensure that a  motorist 
did not burp  or regurgitate alcohol. The judge 
accepted the officer’s evidence and found his 
subjective belief that it was necessary to wait 15 
minutes was reasonable. The accused had admitted 
that it was possible his last drink was less than 15 
minutes before the stop and he wasn't keeping  track 
of when he had his last drink. As well, the accused 
changed his versions on how much he had 
consumed and on how long  it had been since his 
last drink. The judge concluded that the ASD sample 
was taken "forthwith" and complied with s. 254(2) of 
the Criminal Code. The accused was convicted of 
driving  while his blood alcohol content exceeded 
80mg%. 
Sign up for the electronic 
distribution list of “In Service: 10-8” 
now. Go to:
www.10-8.ca
BY THE BOOK:
Bestiality: s. 160 Criminal Code
Every person who commits bestiality is guilty of 
an i nd i c tab le o f fence and l i ab le to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years or is guilty of an offence punishable on 
summary conviction.
Parties	 to	 Offence: s. 21(1) Criminal Code
Every one is a party to an offence who
(a) actually commits it;
(b)  does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding 
any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused appealed his conviction 
arguing  the  ASD breath sample was not 
taken “forthwith” as required by s. 254(2) 
and, as a result, should have been 
excluded as evidence. In his view, the officer 
decided to wait 15 minutes because it was his 
standard practice to observe a  motorist for that 
period. Thus, he suggested the  evidence did not 
support the trial judge’s conclusion that it was 
necessary  to wait 15 minutes before administering 
the ASD test. 
 
The appeal judge examined the meaning  of 
“forthwith” in s. 254(2)  and how long  a police 
officer may wait before taking  a roadside breath 
sample. “It is ... clear that a police  officer is entitled 
to wait 15 minutes if  the delay is reasonable or 
justified,” said the appeal judge. “In particular, the 
officer can delay if there is evidence which leads 
him to conclude that the motorist consumed alcohol 
within that period.” However, it is not acceptable to 
wait 15 minutes in every case for the purpose of 
observing  the motorist to ensure that he  does not 
burp or regurgitate.
Here, the officer waited 15 minutes because he 
thought it necessary to observe the accused for that 
period to ensure that he did not burp or regurgitate 
alcohol. Waiting  15 minutes to observe every 
motorist because they generally cannot be trusted to 
accurately report when they had a drink was not 
reasonable or justified in the circumstances:
[I]t is my view that the ASD was not 
administered forthwith.  [The officer] had no 
reason to and did not believe that [the accused] 
had burped or regurgitated alcohol. Indeed, he 
did not give evidence that he suspected that 
mouth alcohol might be present. Rather, he 
delayed because he concluded that the only way 
to know was to wait 15 minutes, and observe 
[the accused] throughout, and because any 
motorist might have had a recent drink, and lie 
about it. [para. 36, 2014 SKQB 77]
 
Since the officer failed to administer the ASD test 
forthwith, the accused’s rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10
(b)  of the Charter were infringed. The accused’s 
appeal was allowed, the ASD result and the breath 
sample readings were excluded as evidence, his 
conviction was overturned, and an acquittal was 
entered. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown then challenged the 
appeal judge’s ruling. It argued 
that he erred in finding  the police 
officer had failed to administer the 
ASD test “forthwith” and thereby breached the 
accused’s Charter  rights. But the Court of Appeal 
agreed with the Queen’s Bench judge that the  ASD 
test had not been administered “forthwith” in the 
circumstances of this case. As well, the three 
member panel upheld the conclusion that the 
evidence ought to have  been excluded. The Crown’s 
appeal was dismissed and the order directing  an 
acquittal was confirmed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Lomenda, 2014 SKQB 77.
‘AS	 SOON	 AS	 PRACTICABLE’	 IS	 
NOT	 AS	 SOON	 AS	 POSSIBLE	 
R. v. Burwell, 2015 SKCA 37                   
 
Shortly before midnight a police 
officer stopped the accused for a 
traffic infraction. At 11:56  pm he 
made an ASD demand and the 
accused blew a “fail”. At 12:04 am 
the officer made a  demand for a  breath sample. The 
nearest detachment (Delisle) with an Intoxilyzer was 
30 kms away but was not accessible because it was 
locked, there was no staff on call, and the officer did 
not have a key for it. At 12:09 am he then 
transported the accused to another detachment 
(Saskatoon) some 40 kms away where an approved 
instrument was available. When he arrived at the 
Saskatoon detachment at 12:43 am, the officer 
discovered its approved instrument had not been 
serviced and was not immediately operational for 
testing  breath samples. Being  a qualified technician, 
he completed the appropriate maintenance steps 
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required to make the instrument operational, which 
took between 10 to 20 minutes, and then obtained a 
samples of the accuseds breath of 130mg% at 1:06 
am and 120mg% at 1:27 am. The time between the 
demand for breath samples and the taking  of the first 
sample was about 62 minutes. The accused was 
charged with over 80mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the breath 
samples were not taken as soon as 
practicable. There were unreasonable 
delays and the Crown was therefore not 
entitled to rely on the presumption of accuracy 
under s.  258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Although 
the officer tried to take the samples “as soon as 
practicable,” the delay was caused because nobody 
was available at the nearest detachment. This 
required the officer to travel a farther distance to 
another detachment. When there, the Intoxilyzer 
needed maintenance before it could be used 
because  there  was nobody responsible for ensuring 
it was in proper working  order. This caused further 
delay. “The cumulative effect of these delays is that 
the accused’s breath samples were not taken as soon 
as practicable,” said the judge. “As a result, the 
presumption in section 258(1)(c) is lost and the 
Certificate  of Analyses is not evidence of the 
accused’s blood alcohol content as at the time of the 
offence.” Without this evidence, the concentration of 
alcohol in the accused’s blood could not be 
established and he was acquitted.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
A Crown appeal was successful. The 
appeal judge found the trial judge 
applied a standard of “as soon as 
possible” rather than “as soon as 
practicable”. The circumstances existing  after the 
demand was made needed to be considered. “It is 
not realistic to suggest that every  rural detachment 
should have someone available 24 hours a day, 
seven days a  week on the off chance the 
breathalyzer machine in the detachment could be 
made use of at any time,” said the  appeal judge. “It 
is not realistic that qualified breath technicians, who 
have no knowledge in advance of whether they will 
be required at all on a particular shift, remain at the 
detachment in the off chance they are required. It is 
not realistic to expect perfection in the control of the 
expiration dates on the Intoxilyzer solution.” The 
breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable”, 
the presumption in s.  258(1)(c)  was operative and 
the Certificate  of Analyses was proof that the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at 
the time of the offence was over 80mg%. The 
accused’s acquittal was set aside, a conviction was 
entered and the matter was remitted to the trial 
judge for sentencing. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, among 
other things, that the appeal 
judge erred in finding  that 
the accused’s breath samples were taken “as soon as 
practicable.” All three Court of Appeal judges agreed 
that the “as soon as practicable” provision created a 
legal standard, which required a correct result. As 
long  as the first breath sample is taken as soon as 
practicable and no later than two hours after the 
offence has been alleged to have been committed 
(as required by s. 258(1)), the Crown can rely  on the 
breath technician’s certificate to prove the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at 
the time of driving. As a result, there was no need to 
call an expert to prove that fact. However, they all 
gave different reasons concerning  whether the 
standard was satisfied on the facts of this case.
As Soon As Practicable?
Justice Klebuc  concluded that the 
appeal judge correctly  interpreted and 
applied the  “as soon as practicable 
standard” to the  evidence. There is no 
requirement that breath samples be 
taken “as soon as possible”, they  only  need be taken 
Presumption of Accuracy
A certificate of a qualified technician stating the 
analysis of the samples made by means of an 
approved instrument in proper working order 
operated by the technician is evidence of the 
facts in the certificate.
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within a reasonably  prompt time. The slightly longer 
time it took  for the officer to drive to the other 
detachment and service its Intoxilyzer was not a 
delay to be taken into account when assessing 
whether the breath samples were taken within a 
reasonably prompt time. As well, the trial judge 
erred in determining  the “as soon as practicable” 
standard had not been met because breath samples 
possibly  could have been taken earlier had the 
police managed its human and physical resources 
differently. Nor was the closer detachment in 
Deslisle, a rural one, required to be staffed and 
available at all hours of every day in the absence of 
any evidence concerning  its designated hours of 
operation, the financial resources available  to 
maintain it, whether any police staff resided at or 
near it, or of any legal requirement that the police 
make that detachment available  at all times. It was 
also an error for the trial judge to find it an 
unacceptable practice for a qualified technician not 
to be available at the other detachment in Saskatoon 
at all hours of every day  for the purpose of 
conducting  breath tests and maintaining  its 
approved instrument in an immediate  operational 
state. Justice Lebuc granted the accused’s appeal on 
other grounds, set aside his conviction and ordered 
a new trial.
Justice Ottenbreit also found that the 
accused’s breath samples were taken “as 
soon as practicable.” In his view, the 
trial judge improperly  focused on 
systemic and operational police issues 
without an appropriate evidentiary  basis, and 
assumed that the systemic delay was prima facie 
unreasonable and that the Crown needed to explain 
it. “In the context of this case, the fact no one was 
working  or available at the Delisle detachment is not 
prima facie unreasonable so as to place on the 
Crown an onus to explain why this was so and 
require the Crown to give a ‘good’ reason for the 
unavailability,” said Justice Ottenbreit. He further 
stated:
In the circumstances of this case, the summary 
conviction appeal court judge correctly stated 
that the delays were minimal notwithstanding 
the unavailability of the Delisle detachment and 
the expiration of the Intoxilyzer solution. Given 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
As Soon As Practicable
“Subsection 258(1) of the Criminal Code 
provides a simplified method for the 
Crown to establish the offence of 
drinking and driving over .08 by using 
certificate evidence. It is an evidentiary shortcut and is 
essentially an exception to the hearsay rule. If the Crown 
cannot meet the requirements of the section, it can 
always call an expert to correlate the readings back to the 
time of driving.
If all of the requirements are met, however, s.  258(1) 
allows the Crown to rely on the breath technician’s 
certificate to prove what the accused’s blood alcohol 
content would have been at the time of driving in lieu of 
calling an expert to prove that fact.” – Justice Jackson at paras. 
67-68.
“The purpose of s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code is to 
provide the Crown an evidentiary shortcut to proving 
impairment. It is a fair statement that the ‘as soon as 
practicable’ criterion was enacted to ensure that the 
presumption created by the section operates fairly and 
that the breath testing leads to accurate results. As such 
it protects against the manipulation or skewing of the 
results by delaying testing to allow for the absorption of 
alcohol into the accused’s blood. The outer limit of this 
criterion is two hours after the offence was alleged to 
have been committed as regards the first sample.
The interpretation of ‘as soon as practicable’ is informed 
by the criteria of what is reasonable based on the 
circumstances of the case taken as a whole. “ Justice 
Ottenbreit at paras. 118-119.
R. v. Burwell, 2015 SKCA 37
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that the first sample was obtained one hour and 
approximately 11 minutes after the traffic stop 
was made, any prejudice by the short delay of 
driving  to Saskatoon rather than Delisle and 
replacing the solution is inconsequential.
In such a case, where the actions of the officer 
are not in themselves unreasonable and the first 
sample is taken without pushing  the two-hour 
limit, it was not necessary for the Crown to 
explain why the Delisle detachment was 
unavailable or why there was no one tasked at 
that time to keep the solution current. To require 
the Crown to address this issue in the context of 
this case wrongly elevates the onus on the 
Crown to what may be described as the “as soon 
as possible” standard. [paras. 139-140]
Justice Ottenbreit would too grant the accused’s 
appeal so he could advance his other arguments, set 
aside his conviction and order a new trial. 
Justice Jackson  found the appeal judge 
did not give proper effect to the trial 
judge’s findings of fact and, in any 
event, incorrectly determined that the 
first breath sample was taken as soon as 
practicable. She noted that the delay was 71 
minutes, from the time of the observed infraction to 
the taking  of the first breath sample. In her view, the 
trial judge correctly determined that the first breath 
sample was not taken as soon as practicable after the 
offence was alleged to have been committed:
In this case, the trial judge found unreasonable 
delay arising  from these facts: (i) the Delisle 
detachment was not open or accessible; and (ii) 
during  the drive to Saskatoon, which was longer 
than the drive to Delisle, the equipment in 
Saskatoon was not verified to be useable and 
was not, in fact, operational. We do not need to 
assess each of these observations independently 
to determine whether the trial judge’s individual 
attributions of delay are correct. Rather, we must 
assess the trial judge’s conclusion that “the 
cumulative effect” of the delay means that the 
breath samples were not taken as soon as 
practicable.
The trial judge’s conclusion, regarding the 
cumulative effect of the delay, must be assessed 
in light of the length of the delay (71 minutes) 
and the explanation or the lack of explanation 
for it. Here, the evidence of explanation came 
from [the officer], who was admirably frank. It 
was he who had the following expectations: (i) 
the Delisle detachment would be accessible; 
and (ii) the Saskatoon detachment would have 
someone on duty and the Intoxylizer solution 
would be up to date. In light of this evidence, it 
is difficult to see how the trial judge could be 
found to have erred in law when he looked for 
an explanation and found it wanting. Based on 
his findings of fact, his conclusion that the 
breath samples were not taken as soon as 
practicable is correct. [paras. 109-110]
Justice Jackson would have allowed the accused’s 
appeal, set aside the conviction and restored the 
acquittal.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ENOUGH	 GROUNDS	 WITHOUT	 
ISP	 SUBSCRIBER:	 
WARRANT	 VALID
R. v. Thomas, 2015 ABCA 45 
           
A 27-year-old man went online 
presenting  himself as a  19-year-old 
male. He met a  14-year-old girl and 
then later her 13-year-old friend. He 
was able to persuade the girls to 
remove their clothing  and touch themselves while 
he did the same. At one point he met the 13-year-old 
and had sexual intercourse with her. The police 
interviewed the two girls who were able to provide 
considerable information regarding  the offender’s 
identity. The 14-year-old permitted a police officer to 
assume her internet identity and continue 
communicating  with the offender. During 
conversations, the  offender activated his web  cam 
allowing  the officer to identify him as the person 
who lived at the accused’s address. During  one of 
the chats, the officer obtained an IP  address for the 
offender’s username using  free online software. With 
that IP  address and another free public  website, the 
officer determined that the internet service provider 
(ISP)  was Telus Communications. A law enforcement 
request of Telus for information relating  to customer 
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usage was requested and the accused’s name and 
address was provided.
Using  the  identifying  information provided by the 
girls and the ISP  request, a search warrant for the 
accused’s home and vehicle was obtained. It was 
executed and the accused’s computer and other 
items were seized. During  the search the accused 
returned home, was arrested and given a  copy of the 
warrant, which listed the 12 charges. He was 
“chartered and cautioned”, taken to the police 
station and given an opportunity  to consult counsel. 
Then, before  questioning, he was given another copy 
of the search warrant and the charges were read to 
him. The complainant’s name in count 10 had been 
crossed out because it mistakenly referred to one of 
the victims rather than the undercover officer 
standing  in for her. He was told that someone else 
would explain to him later why the name had been 
crossed out. The accused was then given another 
opportunity to contact counsel, which he declined. 
He was told that if he changed his mind to let the 
officer know and he would be allowed to speak to 
counsel again but never did. An interview followed 
and the accused made a number of admissions 
regarding  his conduct and communications with the 
victims, and his understanding  of their ages. He was 
charged with 12 offences. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss.8 and s.10 of the Charter had been 
violated by the police and that all of the 
evidence obtained from his computer 
and his confession should have been excluded. He 
submitted that the ISP information - his name and 
address - provided by Telus breached s. 8. Using  it to 
support the search warrant rendered the items seized 
from its execution inadmissible. As for s. 10, he 
contended that his right to counsel was undermined 
and that his jeopardy had changed such that he was 
entitled to another opportunity to consult counsel.  
The judge disagreed and admitted the evidence. 
First, although the judge found the accused had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in his subscriber 
name and address, this was not objectively 
reasonable. Second, the accused’s right to counsel 
was not undermined nor was there a change in 
jeopardy. He was facing  a charge of communicating 
with someone who was, or whom he believed was, 
under the age of 16 years whether it be one of the 
victims or an undercover officer posing  as her. The 
accused was convicted child internet luring  x 6, 
invitation to sexual touching  x 2, sexual touching 
and sexual assault (intercourse) of a child.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused again argued both his 
s.8  and s.10 Charter rights had 
been violated and the evidence 
should have been excluded under 
s. 24(2).
Unreasonable Search and Seizure?
In R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 14 the Supreme Court of 
Canada established that “a subscriber’s identifying 
information with his or/her ISP is subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and in the 
absence  of exigent circumstances, is not to be 
disclosed to police without judicial authorization.” 
However, in this case it was unnecessary to address 
this issue. 
“First, the other identifying  information obtained 
from the two victims, also referenced in the ITO, was 
more than enough evidence of identification to 
support the search warrant that was issued,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “In other words, the search warrant 
would have  issued even without the information (the 
[accused’s] name and address)  provided by the ISP.” 
Second, the Supreme Court of Canada admitted the 
evidence in Spencer  anyway. “Had the impugned 
information been necessary to obtain the warrant in 
this case, a proper analysis of s.24(2) would have 
come to the same result, particularly since neither 
the police nor the trial judge had the benefit of the 
Spencer decision and to that point the law did not 
require judicial authorization to access that 
information.”
Right to Counsel?
The accused maintained that the failure of the police 
to explain why the victim’s name in count 10 had 
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been erased constituted a  violation of his s.10 
Charter right and his confession ought to have been 
excluded as a result. He argued that crossing  out the 
victim’s name in count 10 caused him confusion and 
the refusal or inability of police to clarify the 
situation prevented him from receiving  effective 
legal advice. But the Court of Appeal disagreed that 
this situation was such that the accused should have 
been given a further right to consult with counsel:
 
In this case, it appears that the [accused] 
understood the accusations relating  to his 
computer luring of the two named complainants. 
Count 10 was worded exactly the same, but with 
the complainant’s name crossed out. That left the 
relevant portion:
... by means of a computer system 
communicate with a person who was, or 
who the accused believed was, under the age 
of 16 years, for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of an offence under s.173(2), 
contrary to s.172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal 
Code.
 
We agree with the trial judge that this change in 
jeopardy (if change it was) was not of a kind that 
would cause a reasonable person to seek further 
legal advice in order to permit him to make an 
informed decision as to whether to cooperate 
with the police. Indeed, the jeopardy the 
[accused] faced under count 10 was arguably 
less than the others for which he had already 
received legal advice, as the person he was 
communicating with in that count was in fact a 
40 year old policeman, rather than a 13 or 14 
year old child.
In any event, even if the [accused’s] legal 
jeopardy had changed, the police provided him 
with the opportunity to contact counsel at that 
point and at any time he wished thereafter. We 
conclude that the [accused] throughout 
possessed sufficient information to make an 
informed and appropriate decision as to whether 
or not he needed to speak to counsel again, and 
he made his choice. [paras. 25-27]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
JACKET	 ABANDONED	 WHEN	 
SUSPECT	 FLED	 POLICE
R. v. Aden, 2015 SKCA 59   
An integrated drug  unit received 
information from confidential 
sources that a group of black males 
were selling  cocaine from a home, 
hotels and vehicles in Saskatoon. As 
a result, police set up surveillance on the residence 
and saw people coming  and going, which was 
believed to be consistent with the information about 
cocaine trafficking  from the  premises.  The 
investigation culminated with a  briefing  and three 
surveillance teams active in the field over a four 
hour period. One of the surveillance  teams consisted 
of two officers under the direction of a sergeant. 
When the officers arrived at the hotel they were 
assigned to watch, they saw a a black male walking 
from the  south end of it. The officers followed the 
male from the hotel. He walked into a Co-op  Home 
Centre  and stayed only briefly, which was believed 
to be consistent with drug  trafficking. The officers 
decided to arrest the man and called out, “Stop, 
police”. The man stopped and the officers grabbed 
him, but he slipped out of his leather jacket and ran 
into traffic on a nearby street. He was subsequently 
apprehended and arrested, and his jacket was 
searched. In the jacket, police  found a plastic  card 
key  for a hotel room which was later searched with a 
warrant. In the room, police located almost eight 
ounces of cocaine  and trafficking  paraphernalia. 
After further evidence was gathered and other arrests 
made, four men, including  the accused, were jointly 
charged with possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused Aden challenged the 
constitutionality of his arrest and the 
subsequent search of his jacket. He 
argued that the arresting  officers did not 
have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him. 
Thus, the search of his jacket, which revealed the 
card key for the hotel room, was made pursuant to 
an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds. 
The search, he suggested, was therefore not valid as 
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an incident to arrest. The judge, however, concluded 
that the accused’s arrest was valid and his s.  9 
Charter rights had not been violated. The police 
officers had the requisite subjective belief that he 
was involved in drug  trafficking  and sufficient 
objective criteria to support that belief. “I arrive at 
this conclusion after assessing  the objectively 
discernible facts – whether inculpatory, exculpatory 
or neutral,” said the judge. “In doing  so I also take 
into account the individual and collective 
experience of the officers involved in drug 
investigations and covert surveillance activities. 
While it is the duty of the  Court to rigorously assess 
the objective facts, it is not the function of the Court 
in hindsight to individually dissect single events or 
inferences.” 
As for the search of the discarded jacket, the judge 
found the accused had abandoned it in an attempt 
to escape the custody of the police. Searching  it was 
not invasive and the police  merely checked its 
pockets. Further, the search was conducted to ensure 
officer and public  safety, to prevent the destruction 
or disappearance of evidence and to find evidence 
of criminal activity. The search was reasonable and 
lawful as an incident to arrest. Section  8 of the 
Charter had not been violated. The evidence was 
admissible, and the accused was convicted on all 
counts and sentenced to 585 days in jail.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the trial judge erred by failing  to 
find that the police breached his 
rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the 
Charter and that the trial judge ought to have 
excluded the evidence of the hotel room card key 
found on him under to s. 24(2).
Arbitrary Detention
The accused submitted that the trial judge did not 
explicitly indicate what the arresting  officer 
subjectively believed at the moment of arrest. But 
the Court of Appeal concluded that it was clear that 
the arresting  officer believed she was arresting  the 
accused for drug  trafficking  and the fact the trial 
judge made no findings in this regard did not 
undermine his ultimate conclusion that the arresting 
officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the 
accused’s arrest.
As of the time of trial, [the officer] had been a 
police officer for 13 years, including five years 
with the Saskatoon Integrated Drug  Unit. In the 
spring of 2012, she was taking part in a major 
investigation that pertained to drug trafficking; 
she had just been briefed by the leaders of the 
particular investigation; she was monitoring the 
radio and she had just been advised that the 
vehicle in which [the accused] had been a 
passenger had been stopped by the police and 
the occupant arrested for drug trafficking.
[The officer] was cross-examined by counsel for 
each of the four accused and re-examined by 
counsel for the Crown. She was asked, in 
varying ways, as to the basis for her arrest. She 
testified the reason she arrested him was “for 
drug trafficking”. She said she “was participating 
in a drug investigation involving two specific 
vehicles”. Later, she stated she would have had 
no reason to arrest [the accused] without the 
information that “trafficking was actually going 
on”. [paras. 63-64]
Unreasonable Search
The accused contended that he did not abandon his 
jacket and therefore maintained a privacy interest in 
it. In his view, he was merely escaping  from an 
“unlawful arrest.” Justice Jackson speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal disagreed:
I see no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s 
finding of fact that [the accused] had abandoned 
his jacket. ... [the accused] slipped out of the 
jacket expressly as a means of trying to escape 
the police during  the course of a lawful arrest. In 
doing so, he left the jacket literally in their 
hands. Clearly, he intended to abandon his 
proprietary interest in the jacket. If [the accused] 
had been able to escape, he would not have 
come back to retrieve his jacket or come looking 
for it at some later time. By leaving it in the 
hands of the police, he acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the reasonable assertion of a 
continuing privacy interest. He may have had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents 
of the jacket pockets, but his expectation was 
not objectively reasonable. [reference omited, 
para. 72]
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And, even if the  jacket were not abandoned, the 
search of it was incidental to his arrest. Citing  R. v. 
Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, Justice Jackson outlined the 
following  principles applicable to searching  as an 
incident to arrest: 
i. the fact the police need to be able to promptly 
pursue an investigation upon making  a  lawful 
arrest is an important consideration underlying 
the power to search incident to arrest;
ii. the power to search incident to arrest is 
contextual, but extends at least to searching  a 
lawfully-arrested person and to seizing  anything 
in his or her possession or immediate 
surroundings to guarantee the safety of the 
police and the accused, prevent the accused’s 
escape or provide evidence against him; and
iii. there  is “simply a requirement that there be 
some reasonable  basis for doing  what the 
police did”. [para. 73]
In this case, the searching  officer said he searched 
the jacket to ensure no weapons were in it that 
could accompany the accused to the police station 
and to discover evidence related to trafficking. In 
finding  the jacket search reasonable, the Court of 
Appeal said:
The police were in a fast-moving investigation. 
Arrests were being  made in three locations 
almost simultaneously. While in the process of 
arresting  [the accused], he slipped free and ran 
into a busy thoroughfare. Officer safety was 
clearly engaged by his actions, and it was 
reasonably probable that evidence would be 
found that would assist the police in concluding 
their multi-faceted investigation. [para. 75]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PELLET	 GUN	 WITHOUT	 
MAGAZINE	 &	 CO2	 CARTRIDGE	 
NOT	 A	 FIREARM
R. v. Crawford, 2015 ABCA 175
Needing  transportation, three men 
found a vehicle idling  but occupied. 
They drove it a short distance but it 
stalled and could not be restarted. A 
few blocks away they found another 
car idling  but occupied. One of them approached 
the driver, drew an unloaded pellet gun, pointed it 
and ordered the driver out of the vehicle. The driver 
complied, and the  three men entered the  vehicle 
and left. The police were contacted immediately and 
located the vehicle through its OnStar GPS system. 
As the police approached, the accused ran but was 
quickly apprehended. A pellet gun was found in the 
vehicle. It was later examined by a  firearms expert 
who reported that it was unloaded and missing  both 
an ammunition magazine and a CO2 canister, which 
was required to fire it. However, once pellets, a CO2 
canister and a magazine was added, the gun could 
discharge a  pellet of sufficient velocity to cause 
serious bodily  harm as measured by the “pig’s eye 
test”. The accused was charged with motor vehicle 
theft and robbery while using a firearm.
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the CO2 pistol 
was a “firearm” for the purpose  of s.344
(1)(a.1)  of the Criminal Code. “Had it 
been loaded (i.e. with the CO2 cartridge 
with some CO2 in it and pellets), it was capable of 
being  fired and causing  bodily injury,” said the 
judge. “Thus, I find it is a ‘firearm’ within the 
meaning  of s.2 of the Criminal Code ... .” The 
accused was convicted of theft of an automobile and 
being  a party to a robbery committed with a  firearm. 
He was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 
sentence of four years’ imprisonment.
“[T]he power to search incident to arrest is contextual, but extends at least to searching 
a lawfully-arrested person and to seizing anything in his or her possession or immediate 
surroundings to guarantee the safety of the police and the accused, prevent the 
accused’s escape or provide evidence against him.”
www.10-8.ca
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Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
finding  that the pellet gun 
was a  f i rea rm for the 
purposes of s. 344(1)(a.1). Although a new trial was 
directed on other grounds, a majority  of the Appeal 
Court nonetheless addressed the pellet gun issue to 
assist the judge at a new trial.
Was the Pellet Gun a “Firearm”?
Justice Martin, speaking  for the majority, found that 
the pellet gun did not meet the definition of firearm. 
He noted that the objective  of the legislation was to 
protect a  victim from serious bodily harm or death, 
not fright or alarm. 
[H]ere the weapon was missing more than 
ammunition and a magazine to be operable. It 
also lacked a CO2 canister with sufficient gas to 
propel a pellet at a velocity to meet the “pig’s 
eye test”. The Crown, relying  on R v Watkins and 
Graber, argues that both the magazine and the 
CO2 canister fall within the meaning of 
ammunition and, therefore, like ammunition, 
they are not required to satisfy the definition. ... I 
respectfully disagree.
In this case, the absence of a magazine to hold 
the pellets, which the expert said was essential 
to load the gun, and a functioning CO2 canister 
rendered the weapon inoperable as a firearm, 
and without those items it could not be made 
operable during the commission of the offence 
or flight therefrom. I note that at the time of their 
arrest (a half hour after the offence, at 5:30 in the 
morning), the [accused] and Anderson had 
already fled the scene and still did not have the 
missing pieces. Even if I am wrong in finding the 
missing magazine significant, the missing  CO2 
canister would lead me to the same conclusion: 
this pellet pistol did not qualify as a firearm.
Therefore, in my opinion, as the weapon was not 
capable of being loaded and fired during  the 
commission of the offence or flight therefrom, 
the trial judge erred in finding  that it was 
nonetheless a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the 
Criminal Code. My conclusion is consistent with 
the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R 
v Smith, 2008  ONCA 151 ... , where the 
weapon, a rifle, used in three robberies was 
missing a breach bolt without which it could not 
be fired. There being no evidence that a breach 
bolt was available “on the scene”, the court 
overturned the trial judge’s finding that the 
weapon was a firearm. [paras. 35-37]
The accused’s appeal was allowed and a new trial 
was ordered.
 
Another View
Justice Wakeling  agreed that a new trial 
should be ordered on other grounds and 
therefore found it unnecessary to address 
the pellet gun operability issue.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Firearm
s. 2 “firearm” means a barrelled weapon from 
which any shot, bullet or other projectile can be 
discharged and that is capable of causing serious 
bodily injury or death to a person, and includes any frame or 
receiver of such a barrelled weapon and anything that can 
be adapted for use as a firearm;
...
Robbery
s. 344. (1)(a.1) Every person who commits robbery is guilty 
of an indictable offence and liable ...  (a.1) in any other case 
where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to 
imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of four years.
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OFFICER’S	 EXPERIENCE	 
MATTERS
R. v. Herritt, 2015 NBCA 33 
A New Brunswick police officer 
w o r k i n g  t r a f f i c e n f o r c e m e n t 
conducted a routine stop  on a vehicle 
with a Newfoundland and Labrador 
licence plate. Section 15(1)(d)  of New 
Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle Act allows police to stop 
a vehicle to check for licences and registration, 
among  other things. The officer detected an 
overwhelming  odour of raw tobacco emanating  from 
the vehicle when he approached its front passenger 
side window. The officer told the accused he was 
being  stopped to check his documents and asked to 
see his licence, registration and insurance. When the 
accused opened the  glove compartment to retrieve 
these things, the officer noted two packages of 
cigarettes with a Québec stamp on them. The 
accused, who was nervous, confirmed that he was 
travelling from New Brunswick back home that day. 
The officer believed he had reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the accused for possession of 
illegal tobacco, but decided not to at that time. He 
first wanted to check the police computer system to 
confirm the accused’s identity, determine if he had 
any prior offences, cautions or warrants, and to 
arrange for backup. While in the process of doing 
this, the accused exited his vehicle and moved 
toward the passenger side while exhibiting  further 
nervousness. He was walking  around and stretching, 
then lit a cigarette. The accused then retrieved his 
jacket by getting  back into the vehicle on the drivers 
side when he could have easily done so through the 
open passenger window. The officer decided to 
make the arrest because the accused’s actions made 
him nervous. He was placed in the rear of the police 
car before backup arrived and was allowed to call 
counsel on a cell phone. Only about four minutes 
elapsed form the time of the initial stop to the arrest.
 
The officer then searched the accused’s vehicle to 
locate evidence related to the suspected offence. He 
found three cartons of cigarettes in the back seat, as 
well as four cardboard boxes containing  sealed 
packages in the trunk  of the  vehicle. The sealed 
packages contained marihuana. The accused was re-
arrested for possessing  marihuana for the purpose  of 
trafficking  and permitted another call to counsel. No 
illegal tobacco was found in the  vehicle. When a 
backup officer arrived, he took the accused to the 
police station and the vehicle was towed to a secure 
garage bay. Another officer at the  garage also noted 
a strong  odour of raw tobacco coming  from the 
vehicle. Police then seized 59½ pounds of 
marihuana in vacuum-sealed bags and one kilogram 
of hashish from the vehicle. The accused was 
charged with trafficking  marihuana and resin and 
possessing it for the purpose of trafficking,.
 
New Brunswick Court 
The accused argued that the officer 
initially  detained him without reasonable 
suspicion, thus breaching  s. 9 of the 
Charter, and also lacked reasonable 
grounds to arrest him for possessing  illegal tobacco, 
making  the arrest unlawful and the vehicle search 
unreasonable under s. 8. The judge found the initial 
roadside stop to conduct the random document 
check lawful. However, he found the arresting 
officer did not had reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that the accused was committing  a 
criminal offence (possessing  a large quantity of 
illegal tobacco). In the  judge’s view, the officer’s 
subjective belief that the accused was in possession 
of contraband tobacco, based on the overwhelming 
smell of raw tobacco, was not objectively 
reasonable. No contraband tobacco was found in 
the vehicle and the odour was equally consistent 
with tobacco being  present in the vehicle on a prior 
occasion (but not at the time of the stop). “In my 
view, [the arresting  officer], in failing  to consider 
and assess other possible exculpatory alternatives for 
the cause of the strong  smell of raw tobacco, 
improperly adopted and applied a reasonable 
suspicion standard in determining  that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds for arresting  [the 
accused].” The accused was arbitrarily detained and 
the warrantless search conducted incidental to his 
arrest was unlawful and breached s. 8 of the Charter. 
The judge excluded the drugs under s. 24(2)  and 
acquitted the accused. 
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New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the  accused’s 
acquittal submitting  that the trial 
judge erred in concluding  that, 
objectively, the arresting  officer 
lacked reasonable grounds to make the arrest. The 
Crown opined that the fact no substantial quantity of 
illegal tobacco was later found in the vehicle did not 
undermine the arresting  officer’s smell of a strong 
odour of raw tobacco. As well, the Crown 
contended that the arresting  officer did not have an 
obligation under law to consider exculpatory 
(innocent)  reasons why the accused’s vehicle might 
smell strongly of raw tobacco when none was 
present. In the Crown’s view, the arresting  officer 
had reasonable grounds to believe that there was a 
large amount of contraband tobacco in the vehicle 
entitling him to arrest the accused. 
 
Reasonable Grounds For Arrest 
Justice Quigg, speaking  for the Court of Appeal 
described the requirement for a lawful arrest this 
way:
 
The reasonable ground standard (consisting of 
an officer’s objectively reasonable subjective 
grounds to make an arrest) is what is required in 
order to make an arrest constitutional, and is 
established using less than the criminal standard 
of proof. [reference omitted, para. 16]
 
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made 
mistakes in assessing  the  officer’s belief. First, the 
trial judge discounted the officer’s belief by requiring 
some explanation for the lack of illegal tobacco 
turned up by the search. “The fact that no large 
amount of tobacco was ever found in the vehicle 
cannot ex  post facto undermine the belief that 
tobacco was there,” said Justice  Quigg. “Although 
the constable was not correct in this assumption, the 
reasonableness of the belief is unaffected by this 
result. This is simply the obverse side of the 
proposition that the results of a positive search 
cannot retroactively verify the  belief.”  This was so 
even though another officer testified that the odour 
of raw tobacco could be explained by an earlier 
presence in the vehicle: 
The constable’s belief cannot be disparaged 
because he was unable to explain why he 
smelled an overwhelming odour of raw tobacco 
and yet found only a small amount. It is true that 
[another officer] ventured an explanation that 
the odour of raw tobacco possibly lingered after 
the tobacco was removed; however, that was a 
different officer’s opinion, and the constable had 
to rely upon his own experience and knowledge 
to substantiate his belief. The possibility that the 
strong odour of raw tobacco confronting [the 
arresting  officer] may have been attributable to 
the past presence of tobacco simply does not 
outweigh the constable’s experience.
 
[The arresting  officer] had been a member of the 
RCMP for almost 23 years. In 2002, he was 
assigned to a pilot project on a highway patrol 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 495 Criminal Code
s. 495.  (1)  A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a)  a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; 
or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in any form 
set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in force within 
the territorial jurisdiction in which the person is found.
“The reasonable ground standard (consisting of an officer’s objectively reasonable 
subjective grounds to make an arrest) is what is required in order to make an arrest 
constitutional, and is established using less than the criminal standard of proof.”
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unit that eventually became the Roving Traffic 
Unit, for which he has been on full-time duty 
since 2004. In addition to his general and other 
more specific police training, the constable took 
a two-day pipeline course in 1995. He described 
this course as being designed to train officers to 
look beyond traffic tickets and detect, by 
recognizing certain indicators of criminal 
conduct, criminals travelling with illegal 
contraband along known corridors or pipelines 
such as main highways, which would include 
Route 2 in New Brunswick. [The arresting 
officer] took this course a second time prior to 
the Roving Traffic Unit being  established on a 
full-time basis. Since then, he has attended 
conferences respecting  travelling  criminals every 
two years. He was trained as an instructor of the 
pipeline course in 2009 and now teaches this 
course to other officers. [The arresting officer] is 
also a trained dog handler and has had a drug 
detection dog  as an aid in performing  his duties 
for the past eight years. On a typical day, he can 
perform 40 to 50 licence plate checks and 
actually stop 15 to 30 vehicles. He estimated 
that, in an average year, he is involved in 25 to 
30 seizures of contraband such as illegal drugs, 
tobacco or firearms. At the commencement of 
the trial on the motion, the constable testified 
that he had seized illegal tobacco on 
approximately 30 to 35 occasions and assisted 
on an additional 10 to 12 occasions in his 
career. He testified that in all such instances, 
when he smelled a strong  or overwhelming 
odour of raw tobacco similar to what was 
emanating from [the accused’s vehicle] vehicle, 
the discovery of a large quantity of illegal 
tobacco resulted. [paras. 22-23]
 
In this case, there were a  number of factors that 
convinced the officer that the accused was 
transporting  i l legal tobacco including  his 
nervousness, the  overwhelming  odour of raw 
tobacco, the out-of-province licence plates, and 
cigarette packages bearing  Quebec stamps. This, 
when viewed through the officer’s experience and 
training, rendered the  probability of a  large quantity 
of tobacco in the accused’s vehicle very high.
 
The trial judge  also erred by inferring  that the officer 
ought to have known there were other possible 
causes for the overwhelming  odour of raw tobacco. 
The trial judge speculated that the  officer had 
additional knowledge that he was withholding  from 
the  court. The trial judge should have only 
considered the actual training  and knowledge 
revealed by the evidence, and assessed whether the 
grounds for arrest were  objectively reasonable 
looking through that lens.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that, objectively, the arresting  officer 
lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for 
possessing  contraband tobacco. The Crown’s Appeal 
was allowed, the accused’s acquittal set aside and a 
new trial ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CAVITY	 EXAMINATION	 NOT	 A	 
CHARTER	 SEARCH:	 
DOCTOR	 NOT	 A	 STATE	 AGENT
R. v. Johal, 2015 BCCA 246
The accused sold a small amount of 
crack cocaine to an undercover 
police officer for $100 after the 
officer dialed a number suspected to 
be associated with a dial-a-dope 
operation. He was immediately apprehended, 
arrested for trafficking  and informed of his Charter 
rights. The police searched the car he had been 
driving  but found no drugs. He was transported to 
the police station where he was strip searched by 
two different police officers. The strip  search was 
conducted in a private room with no windows. An 
officer observed what appeared to be white  powder 
around the accused’s anus and blood in his 
underpants. The officer suspected that the accused 
had hidden a bag  of drugs in his rectum even though 
he could not see anything  in it. Nevertheless, the 
officer feared the bag  may have burst, posing  a risk 
to the accused’s safety. A second officer continued 
the strip  search. He too observed white power 
around the accused’s anus and what seemed to be 
blood on his underpants. This officer was also 
concerned that a  bag  of drugs may have  burst in the 
accused’s rectum despite his denials that he had not 
hidden any drugs. Both officers then took the 
accused to the hospital. They explained to a  doctor 
their suspicion that drugs may be hidden in the 
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accused’s rectum and expressed concern for his 
health and safety. The doctor told the accused that 
he had to submit to an internal search. The officers 
left the room and the doctor digitally  searched the 
accused’s rectum while he was still handcuffed. 
Nothing  was found. Then, about 30 minutes later, 
the accused was x-rayed. The x-ray showed there 
were no drugs hidden in his body. The accused was 
taken back to the  police station where he was 
photographed, fingerprinted and released on a 
promise to appear. He was subsequently charged 
with cocaine trafficking.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused sought a stay of proceedings 
based, in part, on the ground that the 
str ip and internal searches were 
unreasonable under s. 8  of Charter. The 
judge disagreed and found there were no Charter 
breaches.  The arresting  officer “had valid concerns” 
that the accused may have hidden drugs in his 
rectum and was concerned for his safety. Although 
two officer’s were involved with the strip search, the 
judge considered this a single search which did not 
breach s. 8. As for the internal search at the hospital, 
the judge found the doctor was not a state agent 
whose conduct needed to be scrutinized under the 
Charter. In the judge’s view, the doctor performed 
the internal search solely for medical purposes. The 
accused was convicted of cocaine trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the  trial judge erred 
in assessing  both the strip  searches 
and the internal search. In the 
accused’s view, the trial judge  did not consider that 
there  were two strip searches and erroneously found 
the officer’s suspicions were sufficient to justify those 
searches. As for the internal search at the hospital, 
the accused contended that the officers’ suspicions 
were insufficient to justify  it and the doctor was a 
state agent. He had acted at the request of the police 
rather than solely for medical purposes. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused might have been concealing  drugs and 
properly considered the actions of both officers to 
constitute  one  search. The doctor, the  Crown argued, 
was not acting  as a state  agent and the medical 
treatment provided was not a search for Charter 
purposes.
The Strip Search
A strip search may be conducted incidental to a 
lawful arrest provided it is undertaken for the 
purpose of discovering  evidence related to the 
reason for the arrest, justified by reasonable and 
probable grounds and carried out in a  reasonable 
manner. In this case, the accused was lawfully 
arrested and the police were searching  for drugs, 
which was related to trafficking. The Court of Appeal 
concluded the trial judge did not err in finding  there 
were reasonable and probable  grounds for the strip 
search. “[The accused] was operating  a  dial-a-dope 
operation and he sold crack cocaine to an 
undercover officer, yet there were no other drugs 
found in his vehicle,” said Chief Justice Bauman 
speaking  for the unanimous Court of Appeal.  “In the 
experience of the arresting  officers, traffickers 
sometimes conceal drugs in their underpants or 
rectum.” The  strip  search was also carried out in a 
reasonable manner: 
In my opinion, the judge did not err in finding 
that the first search was conducted reasonably. It 
was conducted in a private room at the police 
station by a male officer, who acted quickly and 
ensured [the accused] was not completely 
undressed at any one time. [The officer] did not 
touch [the accused]. ... 
The second look by [another officer] is best 
analysed for the purposes of s.  8  as a 
continuation of the same “search”. [This officer] 
was involved only because [the arresting  officer] 
wanted a second opinion about the white 
powder and blood he had observed. The 
evidence was that the two officers had the same 
motivation and their conduct was identical in all 
material respects. ... [paras. 31-32]
s. 8 Charter
Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. 
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The Internal Search
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling 
that the doctor was not a state agent whose  conduct 
had to be assessed for Charter compliance. “A 
doctor who acts at the request of police  is a state 
agent unless his or her action is performed ‘solely  for 
medical purposes’,” said Chief Justice Bauman. In 
this case, “the officers anticipated that the doctor 
would conduct an internal search and were 
prepared to seize any evidence the doctor 
discovered, but the officers did not direct the doctor 
to conduct the search. Rather, it was the doctor 
himself who deemed an internal search to be 
necessary for [the accused’s] health and safety.”
The fact the police anticipated a doctor would deem 
an internal search necessary for medical purposes 
did not mean they directed it. The police believed 
that a bag  of drugs may have burst in the accused’s 
body which would have placed him in imminent 
danger. “It is clearly  uncontroversial and beyond 
reasonable dispute that is dangerous to have a burst 
package of drugs in one’s body,” said Chief Justice 
Bauman. “I am prepared to take  judicial notice of 
the grave health and safety risk of having  significant 
STRIP SEARCHES:                   
THE BARE ESSENTIALS
In R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 the Supreme Court of 
Canada  provided a list of 11 questions that are useful 
indicators in determining the reasonableness of a strip 
search. These questions outline a framework for the 
police in deciding how best to conduct a Charter 
compliant strip search incident to arrest.
1. Can the strip search be conducted at the police 
station and, if not, why not?
2.  Will the strip search be conducted in a manner 
that ensures the health and safety of all involved?
3. Will the strip search be authorized by a police 
officer acting in a supervisory capacity?
4. Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) 
carrying out the strip search are of the same 
gender as the individual being searched?
5. Will the number of police officers involved in the 
search be no more than is reasonably necessary 
in the circumstances?
6. What is the minimum of force necessary to 
conduct the strip search?
7. Will the strip search be carried out in a private 
area such that no one other than the individuals 
engaged in the search can observe the search?
8. Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as 
possible and in a way that ensures that the person 
is not completely undressed at any one time?
9. Will the strip search involve only a visual 
inspection of the arrestee’s genital and anal areas 
without any physical contact?
10. If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a 
weapon or evidence in a body cavity (not including 
the mouth), will the detainee be given the option of 
removing the object himself or of having the object 
removed by a trained medical professional?
11. Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and 
the manner in which the strip search was 
conducted?  
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quantities of heroin, cocaine or other similar drugs 
rapidly absorbed into one’s blood stream.” 
The Court of Appeal found it was “appropriate to 
conclude, even absent medical evidence, that the 
internal search was necessary for [the accused’s] 
health and safety. The doctor was not investigating  or 
attempting  to collect evidence on behalf of the 
officers; the search was conducted solely for medical 
purposes.” And, even if the accused felt he  had no 
choice but to submit to the internal search and did 
not give his consent to perform it (including  the x-
ray), this would be a medical ethics and possibly 
civil case rather than a Charter compliance issue 
affecting  the constitutional analysis. The doctor 
acted solely for medical reasons and was not a state 
agent.
A NOTE ABOUT NOTES
Neither officer made any notes about the reasons for 
wanting  to strip  search the accused. The Court of 
Appeal found this deficiency “troubling” but not 
sufficiently  serious to render the strip  search 
unreasonable under s. 8  of the Charter. This should, 
however, serve as a reminder for officers to prepare 
accurate, detailed and comprehensive notes, 
particularly about the manner in which a search is 
conducted. The manner of a search is an essential 
element to a s. 8 analysis. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction upheld. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EXIGENT	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 
JUSTIFIED	 SAFETY	 SEARCH	 
DESPITE	 UNLAWFUL	 DETENTION	 
R. v. Fountain, 2015 ONCA 354
The accused and another young 
black male were walking  past a 
police car when he was singled out 
and called over for questioning. The 
police officer was part of the Toronto 
Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), a 
community policing  program within the Toronto 
Police Service. TAVIS officers engage in pro-active 
policing, sometimes randomly approaching  people 
and talking  to them. Information revealed during 
these encounters may be of a general or investigative 
interest and may be documented by means of a Field 
Investigative Report (“208 card”)  with identification 
and association information. This information is used 
to build and maintain a database of individuals and 
their associates, primarily in high-crime or so-called 
“priority” areas. 
The officer, after identifying  the accused and 
confirming  there were no outstanding  warrants of 
arrest for him, began to fill out a 208 card. A third 
man, unknown to either the accused or the officer, 
walked up behind the officer and his partner, and 
began interrogating  the police about harassing  the 
men. The accused abruptly turned sideways, bladed 
his body, placed his left arm on his left hip, and took 
two paces backwards. The officer commanded the 
accused to show his hands, but he failed to do so. 
The officer reached out, patted the accused’s side, 
felt a hard object and yelled “gun”. The accused 
bolted and a gun fell out of his jacket as he jumped 
a fence. He was quickly apprehended. The entire 
encounter from the officer’s initial approach to the 
pat-down lasted only about three minutes. The 
accused was charged with a variety of offences 
related to possessing an illegal handgun. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge recognized that each street-
level encounter must be assessed on its 
own merits even though pro-active 
policing  programs have generally passed 
“A doctor who acts at the request of 
police is a state agent unless his or her 
action is performed ‘solely for medical 
purposes’.”
“It is clearly uncontroversial and 
beyond reasonable dispute that is 
dangerous to have a burst package of 
drugs in one’s body.”
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Charter scrutiny. He noted that the police practice 
known as carding  treads “a very fine line depending 
on the particular circumstance of any given 
situation.” The judge found that the accused had 
been arbitrarily detained (psychologically)  when the 
uniformed officer ordered him, a young, black man, 
to come over and talk. The officer asked if he had 
any open warrants and planned to arrest the accused 
if he did. He told the  accused to keep his hands 
down and did not tell him that he was free to leave. 
In the judge’s view, a reasonable  person in these 
circumstances would have felt compelled to obey 
the officer and that he could not walk away. 
However, the judge found the pat-down search 
reasonable because it flowed from exigent 
circumstances, even though it took place during  an 
unlawful detention. “In all the circumstances it was 
absolutely necessary for the officer to conduct this 
safety pat-down to protect himself,” said the judge. 
“The conduct of the officer was entirely reasonable, 
lawful, and understandable, and justified on officer-
safety grounds.”
The judge concluded that the discovery  of the gun 
did not flow from the unlawful detention, but from a 
lawful pat-down search. Therefore, s. 24(2) of the 
Charter was not triggered. However, even if the gun’s 
discovery resulted from the arbitrary detention, such 
that the gun was “obtained in a manner” that 
violated the Charter, the trial judge found the gun 
was admissible as evidence under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted of possessing  the  firearm and 
sentenced to four years in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in applying 
the exigent circumstances doctrine 
to justify the pat-down search. In 
his view, exigent circumstances could not justify the 
search because the police were  not in the lawful 
execution of their duties at the time. He asserted that 
he had been arbitrarily detained from the moment 
the officer began speaking  to him until the search. 
As well, he contended that the police created the 
exigent circumstances and could not rely on them to 
justify  the search. Since the  search was unlawful, the 
gun should have been excluded as evidence after a 
fresh s. 24(2) analysis was conducted.
Detention
Justice LaForme, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, concluded that the accused was unlawfully 
detained from the moment police called out to him 
and began a conversation. The stop was a “focused, 
investigative engagement” to determine if the 
accused was wanted and the officer admitted he had 
no basis to detain the accused when he began 
speaking  to him. He had no suspicion that the 
accused was involved in any particular criminal 
activity. Since the detention was unlawful it 
breached s. 9 of the Charter.
Pat-Down Search
Although a warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable, a  warrantless safety search, even one 
conducted outside of an investigative detention, may 
be reasonable in appropriate  circumstances. “A 
safety search is generally ‘a reactionary measure’, 
often ‘driven by exigent circumstances’,” said Justice 
LaForme. “For a safety  search to be lawful, an officer 
must ‘have reasonable grounds to believe that there 
“A person blades his body when he turns 
sideways to his counterpart. A person 
may blade his body to protect a firearm 
held on one side.”
“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. But a warrantless safety search 
may be reasonable in appropriate circumstances. A safety search is generally ‘a 
reactionary measure’, often ‘driven by exigent circumstances’. For a safety search to be 
lawful, an officer must’“have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent 
threat” to police or public safety’. A safety search must also be carried out reasonably.”
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is an imminent threat’ to police or public safety.” 
Plus, a safety search must be conducted reasonably. 
And, “even if a safety search takes place in the 
context of an unlawful detention, exigent 
circumstances can still justify the search.” 
The Court of Appeal rejected the  accused's argument 
that the police  could not justify the warrantless 
search on the basis that the exigent circumstances 
were created by their own unlawful conduct. There 
was no evidence that the third party intervened 
because  of an unlawful detention. “A third party 
bystander could not easily tell, in all the 
circumstances of this case, whether [the officer] had 
detained the [accused] or, if he had detained the 
[accused], whether the detention was lawful,” said 
Justice LaForme. “The third party would likely still 
have intervened even if [the officer] had not 
detained the [accused] or if he had lawfully detained 
the [accused].”
The Court of Appeal found the doctrine of exigent 
circumstances justified the search. The police did not 
create their own exigent circumstances. Not only 
did a third party interject in the  encounter, the 
accused became nervous, “bladed” his body, placed 
his left arm on his left hip, and took two paces 
backwards. “A person blades his body when he turns 
sideways to his counterpart,” noted Justice  LaForme. 
“A person may blade his body to protect a firearm 
held on one side.” In this case, the circumstances 
provided the officer with reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused presented an imminent threat to 
his safety and conduct the pat-down search. 
s. 24(2) - Admissibility
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge 
that the unlawful detention and the  gun’s discovery 
were not sufficiently connected to warrant a  s. 24(2) 
analysis. Rather, the lawful search was sufficiently 
linked to the unlawful detention to trigger a s. 24(2). 
However, the gun was nonetheless admissible. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at ww.ontariocourts.on.ca
INCIDENTAL	 SEARCH	 MAY	 
PROCEED	 ARREST	 PROVIDED	 
GROUNDS	 PRE-EXIST	 SEARCH
R. v. Richards, 2015 ONCA 348
A known, reliable confidential 
informer told an OPP officer about a 
man selling  cocaine in Leamington, 
Ontario. He provided the trafficker’s 
nickname, city  where he lived, 
approximate age, kind of car he drove, and 
described him as a short Jamaican male. Two days 
later the officer was able to obtain the accused’s 
name from a Windsor officer who recognized the 
nickname, and also the accused’s description, date 
of birth and photograph. Six days later, the  informer 
was shown the accused's photograph and confirmed 
he was the trafficker. The informer also told the 
officer that the man was going  to travel to Toronto to 
pick up crack  cocaine  and would return on a 
Greyhound bus to Windsor at about 5:00 am the 
following  morning. He would have a quantity of 
crack cocaine with him and would take a 
Leamington Yellow Taxi Ca, which would be waiting 
for him at the Windsor bus station, to Leamington. 
The OPP officer checked the Greyhound bus 
schedule and learned that a  Greyhound bus was 
scheduled to leave Toronto and arrive at the Windsor 
bus depot at about 5:00 am the next morning.  
Police set up surveillance on the  bus depot. They 
immediately noticed a Leamington Yellow taxi, with 
engine running  and lights on, parked in the lot next 
to the bus depot.  Shortly before 5:24 am, a 
Greyhound bus arrived at the Windsor bus depot. A 
man carrying  a knapsack and a white  plastic bag 
exited the bus, walked towards the taxi and entered 
its passenger side. Although the man had a hoodie 
pulled up  over his head, the  OPP  officer believed he 
was the  accused because he was short, there were 
few people on the bus, and he walked directly to the 
waiting  taxi and entered it.  When the taxi pulled out 
of the parking  lot the police followed it.  The OPP 
officer believed that he had reasonable  and probable 
grounds to arrest the accused for cocaine 
possession.
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At 5:30 am, the OPP officer contacted a Leamington 
police sergeant, advised him of the situation and 
asked that the taxi be stopped and the  accused 
arrested.  The accused was also on a recognizance 
not to possess any cell phones, electronic devices or 
drugs. The sergeant directed his members to stop  the 
taxi. It was pulled over and three people were inside 
– the driver, a female in the  front passenger seat and 
the accused. He was sleeping  in the back seat, using 
a backpack as a  pillow for his head. The driver said 
he picked up  his passengers in Windsor. The female 
passenger was recognized as someone heavily 
involved in the Leamington drug  scene. When the 
officer opened the taxi’s rear door to speak with the 
accused, he immediately noticed a fairly large bulge 
in the accused’s  left pocket, which he believed 
could be a weapon.  He patted the outside  of the 
jacket pocket, felt something  hard and asked the 
accused “what do you have in your pocket here?”  
The accused reached into his pocket, pulled out 
three  cellphones and was arrested for breach of 
recognizance.  He was patted-down but no drugs 
were found.  The police seized the backpack from 
the rear seat of the taxi.  The female passenger 
claimed ownership of it and was then arrested for 
possessing  a controlled substance.  Police searched 
the taxi but found no drugs. At the police station, the 
female passenger claimed that the backpack did not 
belong  to her and that she did not know who owned 
it. Police then searched it for drugs. They found 28.5 
grams of crack cocaine hidden inside a pair of 
rolled-up  tube socks, a number of documents in the 
accused’s name and items of men’s clothing. The 
accused was then re-arrested for possessing  a 
controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer who conducted the initial 
traffic stop  said he “wanted a little more” 
before he arrested the accused for 
possessing  a controlled substance, 
despite the information received from the OPP.   He 
testified that when he spoke with the  accused after 
pulling  over the taxi he intended to gather his own 
grounds for arrest. When he saw the bulge in the 
accused’s jacket he was concerned about his safety.
The accused argued that the officer did not have the 
necessary  subjective grounds to arrest him during 
the traffic stop and therefore his ss. 7, 8, and 9 
Charter  rights had been infringed. The judge 
disagreed and found there had been no Charter 
breaches. When the officer saw the bulge in the 
accused’s jacket he had reasonable grounds to 
believe his safety was at risk. The evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted of 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  as 
well as two breaches of his recognizance for 
possessing  cell phones and drugs. He was sentenced 
to 18 months in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that the 
officer did not have the subjective 
grounds to arrest him during  the 
traffic stop. As such, the trial judge 
erred in failing  to find that his ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
rights were breached when the taxi was stopped and 
he was searched. As well, he submitted that the 
judge erred in failing  to find that his s. 8  rights were 
breached when his backpack was searched at the 
police station. As a result, he contended that the 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24
(2). 
The Traffic Stop 
The Court of Appeal found that, even if the officer 
did not subjectively believe he had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused for possessing  a 
controlled substance, he  had a lawful basis to 
conduct an investigative detention. This requires:
On an objective view of the totality of the 
circumstances, the officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion that the particular 
individual is implicated in the criminal activity 
under investigation and that the detention is 
necessary. [reference omitted, para. 32]
Here, the officer reasonably suspected that the 
accused was involved in cocaine trafficking.  The 
officer was entitled to rely on the information and 
direction of his sergeant to conduct an investigative 
detention. The sergeant had reasonable grounds to 
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believe that the accused had controlled substances 
with him. That information was received from the 
OPP  and clearly implicated the accused in the 
criminal activity  under investigation - possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
The Pat-down Search
As for the pat-down search, it was a lawful safety 
search incident to detention and did not violate s. 8 
of the Charter: 
A police officer has the power to conduct a 
safety search incident to an investigative 
detention when the officer believes, on 
reasonable grounds, that his or her safety, or the 
safety of others, is at risk and that, as a result, it 
is necessary to conduct a search. The search 
must also be carried out in a reasonable manner. 
[references omitted, para. 34]
In this case, the officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that his safety was at risk when he patted 
down the accused’s jacket:
When [the officer] opened the taxi door to speak 
with the [accused], he saw a fairly large bulge in 
the [accused’s] jacket pocket. He was close to 
the [accused] on a dark and deserted rural 
highway at about 6:00 a.m. He had been told by 
his instructing supervisor that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
[accused] for possession of crack cocaine, and 
as a police officer, he knew it is common for 
drug traffickers to carry weapons. It was entirely 
reasonable for [the officer] to be concerned that 
the bulge in the [accused’s] pocket might be 
caused by a weapon. [para. 36]
The pat-down search was also conducted in a 
reasonable manner. “[The officer] briefly patted 
down the outside of the [accused’s] jacket in the 
area of the bulging  pocket,” said Justice Gillese. “He 
did not dig  into the [accused’s] pocket nor did he 
ask the [accused] to empty his pockets. The pat-
down was brief, restrained and limited to the one 
specific area of concern.” This was not a “pretext” 
search as suggested by the accused.
The Backpack Search
Even though the police searched the backpack 
before the accused was arrested for possessing  a 
controlled substance, it was still properly conducted 
as an incident to arrest:
A search conducted prior to arrest will 
nonetheless be incidental to that arrest if: (1) 
prior to the search, the police had reasonable 
and probable grounds for the arrest; and (2) the 
arrest occurs quickly after the search. [references 
omitted, para. 41]
First, there were reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the accused for drug  possession prior to 
searching  the backpack. When the  sergeant directed 
the backpack be searched, he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the  accused for 
possession of a controlled substance, which did not 
arise from the discovery of the drugs in the 
backpack. Rather, the sergeant's grounds came from 
the compelling  and credible information provided 
by the  OPP. Thus, he had reasonable grounds to 
arrest for possession before the search. These 
grounds were based on the “totality of the 
circumstances” and included factors such as “the 
reliability of the tipster as a source of information for 
“A police officer has the power to conduct a safety search incident to an investigative 
detention when the officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that his or her safety, or the 
safety of others, is at risk and that, as a result, it is necessary to conduct a search. The 
search must also be carried out in a reasonable manner.”
“A search conducted prior to arrest will 
nonetheless be incidental to that arrest if: 
(1) prior to the search, the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest; and (2) the arrest occurs quickly 
after the search.”
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the police, the source of the tipster’s information, 
and the extent to which the police are able to 
confirm the information before the arrest”: 
[The OPP officer’s] information began with the 
receipt of detailed, compelling  information from 
a reliable CI. The CI told [the OPP officer] that 
the [accused] would arrive on a Greyhound bus 
from Toronto, in the Windsor bus station at about 
5:00 a.m. on February 25, 2010, with a quantity 
of crack cocaine and that a Leamington Yellow 
taxi would be waiting for the [accused] to take 
him to Leamington, where he lived. 
[The OPP officer] testified that the CI had never 
provided false information. The CI had 
frequently given him information about drugs 
and firearms over the two-year period leading  up 
to the events in question.  On two occasions, 
firearms were seized and arrests made as a result 
of information from the CI.  The CI did have a 
criminal record and provided the information for 
financial compensation. [The OPP officer] 
testified that the CI had first-hand knowledge of 
the information provided.
Furthermore, as on many prior occasions, [The 
OPP officer] was able to verify material aspects 
of the information provided by the CI.  [paras. 
44-46]
As well, the accused was at the police station when 
the backpack was searched and was arrested on the 
drug  charges shortly after the drugs were discovered 
in the backpack. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
R. v. Richards, 2015 ONCA 348 Grounds Grid
Confidential Informer (CI)    
Information
Corroboration
The CI provided the nickname and a description 
of a man who was selling cocaine in Leamington.  
The CI described the man as a short Jamaican. 
The officer contacted the Windsor Police, who recognized the 
nickname provided by the CI. The Windsor Police identified the 
trafficker as the accused.  A photograph of the accused was 
obtained and other information, including his date of birth. The 
officer showed the photograph to the Cl who confirmed that the 
accused was the man who had been selling cocaine in Leamington.
The Cl said the accused was going to travel to 
Toronto to pick up crack cocaine and would 
return to Windsor by Greyhound bus the 
following day around 5 am.
The officer reviewed the Greyhound bus schedule and confirmed 
that a Greyhound bus was scheduled to leave Toronto and arrive in 
Windsor about 5:00 a.m. The officer went to the Windsor bus 
depot and saw a Greyhound bus from Toronto arrive at 5:24 am. 
The CI said that a Yellow Taxi Cab Company taxi 
from Leamington would be waiting for the 
accused's arrival at the Windsor bus depot.
When the officer arrived at the Windsor bus depot, he 
immediately noticed a Leamington Yellow Taxi Cab Company taxi 
parked in the parking lot next to the bus depot.  The taxi's engine 
was running and its lights were on.
The CI said that after the accused’s bus arrived at 
the Windsor bus depot, he would take the 
Leamington Yellow Taxi Cab Company taxi that 
had been waiting for him from Windsor to 
Leamington.
At about 5:24 am, the officer saw a person he believed to be the 
accused leave the bus at the Windsor bus depot, walk towards the 
Leamington Yellow Taxi Cab and enter it. The police followed the 
taxi as it drove to Leamington.  Although the officer could not see 
the man’s face as he walked towards the taxi because he had a 
hoodie pulled up over his head, the officer believed that this 
person was the accused because he exited the bus and walked 
towards the waiting Yellow taxi, he was a short man and there 
were not many people on the bus.
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POLICE	 DID	 NOT	 CREATE	 
EXIGENCIES	 BY	 NOT	 ARRESTING
R. v. Paterson, 2015 BCCA 205
Po l i c e a n d a m b u l a n c e w e r e 
dispatched to an incomplete 911 call 
from a cell phone. The police were 
informed that the 911 caller was 
female, crying  and apparently 
injured. The owner of the cellphone (the mother) 
had given it to her daughter to use. The mother 
called her daughter’s place of employment but was 
told she had not shown up for work. The mother 
then drove to her daughter’s boyfriend’s home where 
she saw her daughter’s car parked. The mother 
called the cell phone but received no answer. The 
mother then told police that she thought her 
daughter was with her boyfriend, the accused, who 
lived in a nearby apartment. The mother said that the 
two had a volatile  relationship and had a “previous 
history”, which an officer understood was a previous 
assault. The mother also said the accused had a 
shotgun.
The police went to the apartment building  and 
learned that the daughter had been transported by 
ambulance to the hospital with unknown injuries. 
Officers concluded that the dropped 911 call came 
from the accused’s apartment and wanted to 
determine if anyone else was in the apartment or 
needed assistance. They knocked several times and 
announced “police”, yet no one answered. The door 
was locked and light could be seen under it, but 
nothing  was heard. As an officer put a pass key 
obtained from the manager in the door, the accused 
opened it. As soon as the door opened, the officer 
smelled a  fairly strong  odour of raw and smoked 
marihuana. A second officer could only smell 
smoked marihuana. When questioned about the 911 
call, the accused first said he did not know anything 
about it, and then said they should ask his girlfriend. 
He told police he found her on the floor when he 
got out of the shower, and helped her up and out of 
the apartment. The accused seemed “physically 
okay” and was not in need of any assistance. The 
police noted his cell phone rang  non-stop while he 
was questioned. 
When questioned about the marihuana smell, the 
accused denied the odour was coming  from his 
apartment but then admitted smoking  some. He said 
he still had some “roaches” (unconsumed 
marihuana) lying  around. The police decided to 
seize  the marihuana and “be on their way” without 
charging  the accused with drug  offences. The 
accused agreed to hand over the “roaches” but 
attempted to close the door. An officer used his foot 
to prevent the door from closing  fearing  that the 
accused would destroy evidence and for officer 
safety (they  had been told he had a shotgun). The 
accused then told the officer that he could enter the 
apartment. When police entered, the accused picked 
up  a baggie on the kitchen counter to hand over. The 
officer saw a bullet-proof vest in the living  room 
area, a handgun on an end table and a bag  of pills 
on a speaker stand. He arrested and searched the 
What the police found included:
• a loaded Smith & Wesson 38 special revolver.
• a Ruger P85 9-millimetre semi-automatic pistol 
containing a 15-cartridge ammunition magazine.
• a Ruger P90 45-calibre semi-automatic pistol 
containing an ammunition magazine with seven 
cartridges in it.
•  an IMI Desert Eagle 44-calibre Remington 
Magnum semi-automatic pistol with an 
ammunition magazine with eight cartridges in it. 
• cocaine worth $31,200 at the wholesale level.
• methamphetamine worth $5,850 at the 
wholesale level.
• ecstasy worth $17,466 at the wholesale level.
• a bulletproof vest.
• a bag of marihuana. 
• $30,000 in cash in a box underneath the couch. 
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accused, finding  a Blackberry cell phone and 
$4,655 in cash. The premises was “cleared” for 
officer safety purposes. The police were looking  for 
any other persons. In a closet police found two large 
bags of orange and blue pills (ecstasy), and a  bag  of 
crack cocaine. The apartment was secured, the 
accused transported to the police station and a 
search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA)  was obtained. When police 
attended the hospital, the injured woman said she 
slipped, hit the back of her head and called 911. 
When the search warrant was executed, three more 
handguns were found in a bedroom drawer as well 
as another bag  of drugs in the  kitchen. A Form 5.2 
was filed by police several months after the seizure. 
The accused was charged with several offences
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter had been violated and 
sought the exclusion of the evidence.  In 
his view, the police entry into the 
apartment building  and then his apartment were 
unreasonable. The judge, however, disagreed. He 
concluded that the police were entitled to enter the 
apartment building, based on their common law 
duty  to protect life  and public safety, and were 
entitled to enter the apartment unit based on exigent 
circumstances. Entering  the apartment building, 
listening  at the  accused’s door, looking  under it for 
light, testing  the doorknob  to see if it was locked and 
inserting  a key into the lock and turning  it was all 
reasonable. Although the police knew the woman 
was not in the apartment, the judge accepted the 
officer’s testimony that it was common in 911 calls 
for there to be more than one victim. 
As for the search, the police had the grounds to 
obtain a  search warrant under s. 11(1) of the CDSA 
but by reason of exigent circumstances it was 
impracticable to do so. The smell of marihuana and 
the accused’s admission he had some provided the 
grounds. The exigent circumstances resulted from 
the belief the accused would likely have destroyed 
the evidence while a warrant was obtained since the 
police were not going  to arrest him. As well, the 
police had a right to “clear” the  apartment on officer 
safety grounds. The judge upheld the search warrant 
but found the delay in filing  the incorrectly 
completed 5.2 report constituted a breach of s. 8. 
He nevertheless admitted the evidence under s. 24
(2). The accused was convicted of nine  offences: 
possessing  illicit drugs x 2, possessing  illicit drugs for 
the purpose of trafficking  x 3  and unlawful 
possessing a firearm x 4.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in finding  that 
the entry and search of his 
apartment was justif ied based on exigent 
circumstances.  
BY THE BOOK:
s.	 11	 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
s. 11 (1) A justice who, on ex parte application, 
is satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) a controlled substance or precursor in 
respect of which this Act has been contravened,
(b) any thing in which a controlled substance or precursor 
referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or concealed,
(c) offence-related property, or
(d) any thing that will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence under this Act or an offence, in whole or in part in 
relation to a contravention of this Act, under section 354 or 
462.31 of the Criminal Code
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant authorizing a 
peace officer, at any time, to search the place for any such 
controlled substance, precursor, property or thing and to 
seize it.
…
(7) A peace officer may exercise any of the powers 
described in subsection (1), (5) or (6) without a warrant if 
the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of 
exigent circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain 
one.
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Apartment Entry
The accused submitted that the police created  the 
“exigent circumstances” and the impracticability of 
obtaining  a search warrant by the way they handled 
the situation. But Justice Bennett, speaking  for the 
unanimous Court of Appeal, disagreed. In her view, 
the police had the necessary grounds to arrest the 
accused, to obtain a search warrant and in believing 
that exigent circumstances existed:
The police smelled marihuana and [the accused] 
admitted having marihuana in the premises. [The 
accused] was in the premises, and the police 
had no intention of arresting him. I note, 
parenthetically, that the trial judge was alive to 
the possibility that the police were creating a 
situation so they could enter the apartment 
without a warrant, and found that they had not 
done so. He accepted their evidence that they 
only wanted to seize the “roaches”, and then 
would be on their way in a “no case” seizure. 
Had they left [the accused] to obtain a warrant, 
he could have easily destroyed the roaches.
The next question is whether the trial judge was 
correct in concluding  that it was “impracticable” 
to obtain a warrant. In R. v. Erickson, 2003 
BCCA 693..., this Court concluded that 
“impracticable” means “something less than 
impossible and imports a large measure of 
practicality, what may be termed common 
sense”.
In this case, the police would have had to arrest 
[the accused], a much greater interference with 
his liberty rights, and obtain a warrant to seize 
the roaches. The police weighed these options, 
and concluded that it was not practical (in my 
words) to take those steps for what they believed 
would be a “no case” seizure. In these 
circumstances, the trial judge concluded that it 
was impracticable to obtain a warrant, and there 
is no basis to interfere with this finding. [paras. 
72-74]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BURDEN	 OF	 PROVING	 
ARBITRARY	 DETENTION	 LIES	 
WITH	 ACCUSED
R. v. Hardy, 2015 MBCA 51                    
The accused was arrested for failing 
to provide a roadside breath sample 
after he made a number of attempts 
to blow into an ASD. Police had 
stopped him when he was seen 
driving  a vehicle in the dark without its headlights 
on and did not stop at a stop  sign. He had glossy 
eyes, admitted to drinking  two beers and there were 
unopened cans of beer in his vehicle.  He was 
transported to the police station where a  demand 
that he provide a  breathalyzer sample  was made.  
After refusing  to provide a breathalyzer sample he 
was detained in custody overnight at a correctional 
facility under s. 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code. He 
was released the following  morning  after having 
been detained for about 12 hours. He was charged 
with refusing  to provide a breath sample by means 
of an approved screening device (ASD).
Manitoba Provincial Court
The accused argued that the  decision to 
detain him overnight was not based on 
his level of intoxication but rather as 
punishment for the fact that he refused to 
provide a breathalyzer sample  at the  police 
station.  He submitted that the police failed to 
comply with s. 497 and therefore his detention was 
arbitrary  under s. 9 of the Charter. He wanted a 
judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter or, at least, the exclusion of his refusal to 
provide a breath sample under s. 24(2). The judge, 
however, convicted the  accused. She found that the 
accused failed to establish a s. 9 Charter breach: 
 
There is no evidence in this case of any systemic 
abuse with regard to the application of Section 
497. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that 
an individual assessment is made in each case 
with respect to the issue of release. That decision 
is not left solely in the hands of the investigating 
officer, but rather is subject to review by the 
supervising sergeant prior to implementation. 
Volume 15 Issue 3 - May/June 2015
PAGE 33
There is ample evidence from credible police 
officers, some of which is corroborated by [the 
accused’s] own evidence, that [he] was in an 
emotional and agitated state. That he was 
belligerent and uncooperative with police.  
There was evidence of consumption of alcohol 
and police formed a subjective belief the 
accused was intoxicated. Section 497(1.1) is not 
exhaustive and police clearly are to consider the 
totality of the circumstances related to an 
accused in assessing whether a public safety 
justification exists for detaining the accused.  
Here, as I have said, they were dealing with a 
highly emotional, uncooperative person they 
believed to be intoxicated and acting  in a 
manner inconsistent with his own best interests.  
I can come to no conclusion other than that the 
police decision to lodge the accused in custody, 
pursuant to Section 497 of [t]he Code, was 
justifiable.
 
The length of detention was essentially 
overnight, and I find that it was not an excessive 
period of time in all the circumstances.  There is 
nothing  in the evidence I have accepted as 
credible, to support a finding that the police 
exercise of discretion here was capricious or 
unjustifiable. Ultimately, the accused bears the 
burden of establishing  a Section 9 [C]harter 
breach on a balance of probabilities, and he has 
failed to do so here.  His own evidence was very 
unreliable … .
 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused appealed the trial judge’s 
dismissal of his Charter application. The 
appeal judge, however, agreed with the 
trial judge and adopted her reasoning  in 
determining  that the accused was properly detained 
for reasons of public interest pursuant to s. 497(1.1)
(a).
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused again appealed the 
Charter ruling  arguing  that a s. 9 
b r e a c h r e s u l t e d f r o m h i s 
warrantless arrest and detention 
under s. 497 and the  onus was on the Crown to 
show his detention was not arbitrary. Further, he 
suggested the judge erred in finding  his continued 
detention justified. In his view, the  decision to 
detain him was not properly assessed, was for an 
improper purpose and he should have  been given 
the opportunity to contact a sober third party to 
whom he could be released. Finally, he asserted that 
once detained, he should have been monitored to 
determine whether the initial conditions for 
detention continued to exist.
Arbitrary Detention
 
An unlawful detention is arbitrary and therefore 
amounts to a  s. 9 violation. Said another way, a 
lawful detention is not arbitrary unless the law 
authorizing  it is arbitrary.  In R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 
32, the Supreme Court of Canada found this 
approach mirrored the s. 8  jurisprudence in that a 
search must be authorized by law, the law must be 
reasonable and the search must be carried out in a 
reasonable manner. 
But the accused took this one step  further and 
analogized that once it was shown that the accused 
was arrested and detained without warrant, the 
subsequent detention must be presumed arbitrary 
and the onus shifted to the Crown to establish that 
the detention was justified in the public interest. This 
is similar to the case law that once an accused has 
demonstrated that a search or seizure was 
warrantless it is presumed to be unreasonable and 
the onus shifts to the Crown to show it was 
reasonable. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the accused bears the legal burden 
to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that there 
were no reasonable grounds for the detention. 
 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that the legal burden 
of proving  an arbitrary detention, as in this case, lies 
with an accused. However, the Crown may be 
required to explain, by adducing  evidence, the 
reasons for detention:
s. 9 Charter
Everyone has the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 
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The accused has not convinced me that the 
circumstances of this case create a presumption 
of arbitrariness, thereby shifting  the legal burden 
to the Crown such as in s. 8  Charter warrantless 
searches or Charter waiver cases. Unlike those 
exceptions, in this case the alleged breach is 
post-arrest, it does not involve circumstances 
where a breach may bear directly on the guilt or 
innocence of an accused, and it does not 
involve evidence statutorily required for proof of 
an offence.
However, in certain circumstances where an 
accused raises a s. 9 argument which the Crown 
seeks to justify on the basis of s. 497(1.1), an 
evidential burden may arise requiring  the Crown 
to explain the reasons for the detention.
... 
Thus, where an accused presents a prima facie 
case of arbitrary detention, an evidential burden 
arises for the Crown to present evidence 
justifying the detention.  The evidential burden 
arises because, it is the police officers who have 
the exclusive knowledge of the reasons for the 
detention.  
In the context of s. 497(1.1), the Crown’s 
evidential burden is to adduce evidence as to 
the peace officer’s belief, on reasonable 
grounds, that detention is necessary on any of 
the grounds enunciated in the section.  After 
considering all of the facts and circumstances, 
including  the objective reasonableness of the 
police officer’s subjective belief and any 
alternative or improper motive on the part of the 
police, the court then decides whether a breach 
has been proven. This is in contrast to placing a 
legal burden on the Crown which would dictate 
that, in the absence of any evidence having 
been called by the accused except for the fact 
that he was arrested without warrant, the Crown 
would bear the legal burden of proving 
compliance with s. 9 in every case where an 
accused has been detained.
In this case, the accused having shown that he 
was arrested without warrant and detained in a 
correctional facility for 12 hours, the evidential 
burden shifted to the police/Crown to justify his 
detention pursuant to s. 497(1.1). [paras. 39-44]
 
Was the Detention Justified?  
Under s. 497(1.1)  there are a  number of factors to 
be considered in the decision to detain, including 
the public interest, establishing  identity, securing 
and preserving  evidence, prevention of continuation 
of the offence or of the commission of another 
offence, ensuring  the safety and security of a victim, 
as well as administrative  concerns such as ensuring 
court attendance. “The decision to detain is highly 
contextual,” said Justice Cameron. “There are 
numerous factors that courts have considered in 
deciding whether to detain an arrestee.”
BY THE BOOK:
s. 497 Criminal Code
s. 497 (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), if a peace 
officer arrests a person without warrant for an 
offence described in paragraph 496(a), (b) or 
(c), the peace officer shall, as soon as 
practicable,
(a)  release the person from custody with the intention of 
compelling their appearance by way of summons; or
(b)  issue an appearance notice to the person and then 
release them.
 
Exception
497. (1.1) A peace officer shall not release a person under 
subsection (1) if the peace officer believes, on reasonable 
grounds,
(a) that it is necessary in the public interest that the person 
be detained in custody or that the matter of their release 
from custody be dealt with under another provision of this 
Part, having regard to all the circumstances including the 
need to
(i) establish the identity of the person,
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the 
offence,
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence or 
the commission of another offence, or
(iv) ensure the safety and security of any victim of or 
witness to the offence; or
(b)  that if the person is released from custody, the person 
will fail to attend court in order to be dealt with according 
to law.
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In this case, the judge did not err in her 
determination that the detention was lawful under s. 
497(1.1). She found “the accused was in an 
‘emotional and agitated state,’ ‘belligerent and 
uncooperative with police,’ that there was ‘evidence 
of consumption of alcohol and police formed a 
subjective belief the accused was intoxicated’, and 
the accused was ‘acting  in a manner inconsistent 
with his own best interests’.” Furthermore, she 
rejected the accused’s evidence that the police 
threatened him with jail overnight if he did not 
comply with the breathalyzer demand. Ultimately, 
“the circumstances under which detention may be 
justified are  varied, contextual and require 
individual assessment in each case.”
  
Obligation to Release to a Sober Party
As for there being  a positive legal obligation on the 
police to consider release to a sober third party, 
Justice Cameroon found there was no such duty. “In 
my view, there is no bright line  legal obligation to 
consider release to a sober third party in every 
instance, as argued by the accused,” she said. “Each 
case must be determined on its own facts.  ... [T]he 
police obligation is to ‘undertake a reasonable 
assessment of the sobriety of the accused and his or 
her suitability for release’.”  She also disagreed “that 
there  is a positive legal obligation on the police to 
allow an accused an opportunity to phone and look 
for someone to pick  him or her up.” Again, such an 
analysis will be contextual and fact driven.
Continued Detention
The accused argued that, even if his detention was 
initially  justified, there was an ongoing  obligation on 
the police to continually assess the situation to 
determine whether the conditions for detention 
continued to exist or whether there was a change of 
circumstances requiring  he be released “as soon as 
practicable.” The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that once the decision to detain had been 
made, the detained person must be  brought before a 
justice within twenty-four hours under s. 503.
Justice Camerson noted that there was no 
requirement for an ongoing  and continuous 
reassessment process. “To start, there  is nothing  in s. 
497 that requires that an accused be monitored 
during  the 24 hours that he or she is detained prior 
to taking  him or her before a justice.” She 
continued:
Furthermore, if a person is deemed acceptable for 
release prior to the expiry of 24 hours, this does not 
now mean that s. 497(1) comes into play mandating 
release “as soon as practicable.” On the other hand, 
it does not mean that once it is determined that an 
accused person should be detained pursuant to 
s. 497(1.1), the detention must necessarily last until 
the accused is brought before a magistrate pursuant 
to s. 503. As previously mentioned, the police must 
make an individual assessment based on all of the 
circumstances in each case. [para. 63]
Release will depend on all the circumstances and 
the accused may call evidence that the length of his 
holding  or continued detention was arbitrary. 
However, simply showing  that an accused was held 
overnight may not be enough. Evidence such as the 
nature and frequency of contact an accused had 
with police may be required in the analysis.
The trial judge did not err in holding  that the police 
decision to detain the accused overnight was 
unreasonable. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[T]here is no bright line legal obligation 
to consider release to a sober third party 
in every instance.”
“[I]f a person is deemed acceptable for release prior to the expiry of 24 hours, this does not now 
mean that s. 497(1) comes into play mandating release ‘as soon as practicable.’ On the other 
hand, it does not mean that once it is determined that an accused person should be detained 
pursuant to s. 497(1.1), the detention must necessarily last until the accused is brought before a 
magistrate pursuant to s. 503.”
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BRITISH	 COLUMBIA:	 
CANADA’S	 MOST	 EXPLOSIVE	 
PROVINCE
According  to data  released by the Canadian Bomb 
Data Centre in 2015, Canada had a total of 137 
explosive  incidents in 2014. British Columbia 
ranked first among  incidents, bombings, attempted 
bombings, improvised explosive device recoveries, 
hoax devices and explosives thefts. There were no 
deaths or injuries reported as a result of these 
incidents.
The following  definitions will help  explain the 
incidents reported in the table below.
Incidents – The number of times Explosives Disposal 
Units were called to scenes involving  the possible 
use of explosives.
Bombings – Explosions of devices created for non- 
authorized or criminal use.
Attempted  Bombings – An explosion where one or 
more IEDs failed to function because of an 
unintentional defect in design or assembly.
Hoax Devices – A device constructed from inert or 
non-explosive components intended to resemble 
actual bombs.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  – A bomb 
created for non-authorized use.
Recovered IEDs – Number of IEDs, that were 
recovered by Explosives Disposal Units. At one 
incident, one or more IEDs can be recovered.
Explosive Thefts – Incidents that involved reporting 
stolen explosives materials.
Explosive Recoveries –  Recovery of commercial and 
military explosives.
Source: 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/tops-opst/cbdc-ccdb/crim-use-usage-explo-eng.htm
Region Incidents Bombings Attempted 
Bombings
Hoax 
Devices
Recovered 
IEDs
Explosive 
Thefts
Explosive 
Recoveries
Accidental 
Explosion
British Columbia 49 6 4 4 17 3 12 -
Alberta 8 - 1 2 2 - 3 -
Saskatchewan 12 - - 1 - - 8 -
Manitoba 6 - - 2 - - - 1
Ontario 16 1 1 3 3 - 5 -
Quebec 5 - - 1 1 - 3 -
New Brunswick 8 - - 1 1 - 2 -
Nova Scotia 18 - - 1 1 - 16 -
Prince Edward Island 2 - - - - - 2 -
Newfoundland 11 - - - 1 - 10 -
North West Territories - - - - - - - -
Yukon 2 - - - - - 2 -
Nunavut - - - - - - - -
Canada 137 7 6 15 26 3 63 1
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BC’s	 NEW	 LEFT	 LANE	 LAW
As of June 12, 2015, drivers 
in British Columbia must 
stay out of the leftmost lane 
of a multi-lane highway 
unless they have a good 
reason to travel in it. Under 
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act a 
new section was added 
which requires drivers on 
multi-lane highways where 
the speed is more than 80 
km/h per hour to stay to the 
r i gh t un le s s t hey a re 
overtaking  and passing 
another vehicle, moving  left 
to allow traffic to merge, preparing  for a  left hand 
turn, or moving  left to pass an official vehicle 
displaying  a flashing  light (such as a police car, 
ambulance, or tow truck). If the actual speed of 
traffic is below 50 km/h, such as periods of 
congestion, drivers can use the left-most lane to 
keep traffic flowing.
“During the Rural Highway Safety and Speed 
Review last year, I heard that one of the top driver 
frustrations across the province was being 
prevented from passing because  someone won’t 
leave the left lane,” said Minister of Transportation 
and Infrastructure Todd Stone. “We have 
strengthened the law to give police better tools to 
crack-down on left-lane hogs.”
“Drivers who block the left lane increase the risk 
caused by aggressive drivers who will pass on the 
right or tailgate,”  said Chief Neil Dubord, chair of 
the BC Association of Chiefs of Police Traffic Safety 
Committee. “This change provides clarity to police 
officers who will enforce  the requirement for 
vehicles to travel in the right lane.”
Penalty
The ticketed amount for violating  s. 151.1(3)  - 
improper use of leftmost lane - is $167, with three 
driver penalty points. This includes a  $145 fine plus 
a $22 victim surcharge levy. If the ticket is paid 
within 30 days the fine is reduced by $25.
BY THE BOOK:
s.	 151.1	 BC’s	 Motor Vehicle Act
When drivers must not use 
leftmost lane 
s. 151.1 (1) In this section, “leftmost lane”, in 
relation to a laned roadway to which this section applies, 
means the lane that is furthest to the left of the marked 
lanes available for traffic proceeding in the same direction, 
other than
(a) a bus lane, 
(b) a high occupancy vehicle lane, or 
(c) a designated use lane.
(2) This section applies to a laned roadway if 
(a) there are 2 or more marked lanes available for traffic 
proceeding in the same direction, other than a bus lane, 
a high occupancy vehicle lane or a designated use lane, 
(b) the speed limit is at least 80 km/h, and 
(c) the actual speed of traffic is at least 50 km/h.
(3) A driver of a vehicle in the leftmost lane must exit the 
lane on the approach of another vehicle in that lane, if it is 
safe to do so, except when
(a) overtaking and passing a third vehicle, 
(b) allowing traffic to merge, 
(c) preparing for a left hand turn at an intersection or into 
an exit, a private road or a driveway, or 
(d) passing an official vehicle stopped on the side of or on 
the roadway.
Note: “official vehicle” is defined in s. 47.01 of the Motor 
Vehicle Act Regulations. 
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